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Employment Protection and Product Market Competition

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  • Sebastian G. Kessing

Abstract

A firm facing employment protection will defend its market position more fiercely than a rival firm operating without such restrictions. However, "ex ante" such firms may be more reluctant to expand. For the benchmark case of contest competition, the defensive effect dominates. A firm facing employment protection has a stronger average market position. Copyright The editors of the "Scandinavian Journal of Economics" 2006 .

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Scandinavian Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 108 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (07)
Pages: 339-352

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Handle: RePEc:bla:scandj:v:108:y:2006:i:2:p:339-352

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  1. Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1991. "The All-Pay Auction With Complete Information," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1007, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
  2. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1996. "Contest Success Functions," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 283-90, February.
  3. Belot, Michèle & Boone, Jan & van Ours, Jan C, 2002. "Welfare Effects of Employment Protection," CEPR Discussion Papers 3396, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Konrad, Kai A., 2000. "Trade contests," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 317-334, August.
  5. Saint-Paul, G., 1995. "Employment Protection, International Specialization, and Innovation," DELTA Working Papers 95-31, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
  6. Glazer, A. & Kanniainen, V., 2000. "The Effects of Employment Protection on the Choice of Risky Projects," Papers 00-05, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
  7. Koeniger, Winfried, 2002. "Employment Protection, Product Market Competition and Growth," IZA Discussion Papers 554, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  8. Konrad, Kai A, 2001. "Repeated Expropriation Contests and Foreign Direct Investment," CEPR Discussion Papers 2695, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. Dixit, Avinash K, 1987. "Strategic Behavior in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 891-98, December.
  10. Giulio Fella, 2000. "Investment in General Training with Consensual Layoffs," Working Papers 418, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
  11. Stergios Skaperdas & Constantinos Syropoulos, 2002. "Insecure Property and the Efficiency of Exchange," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(476), pages 133-146, January.
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Cited by:
  1. Lommerud, Kjell Erik & Straume, Odd Rune, 2007. "Technology resistance and globalisation with trade unions: the choice between employment protection and flexicurity," Working Papers in Economics 13/07, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
  2. Kjell Erik Lommerud & Odd Rune Straume, 2012. "Employment Protection Versus Flexicurity: On Technology Adoption in Unionised Firms," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 114(1), pages 177-199, 03.
  3. Fritz Helmedag, 2005. "Möglichkeiten und Grenzen eines Beschäftigunspaktes," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), Justus-Liebig University Giessen, Department of Statistics and Economics, vol. 225(2), pages 151-162, March.
  4. Haaland, Jan I. & Wooton, Ian, 2003. "Domestic Labour Markets and Foreign Direct Investment," CEPR Discussion Papers 3989, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Koeniger, Winfried, 2005. "Dismissal costs and innovation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 79-84, July.

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