The Effects of Employment Protection on the Choice of Risky Projects
AbstractWe consider a firm that is subject to employment protection laws that limit the firm‘s ability to fire labor. In particular, we suppose that though a firm which shuts down can fire all its workers, it may fire no fewer. Compared to a firm that is subject to no employment protection, a firm constrained in firing will prefer a risk-free project over a risky one, but may prefer the riskier of two risky projects.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 689.
Date of creation: 2002
Date of revision:
project choice; labor protection;
Other versions of this item:
- Glazer, A. & Kanniainen, V., 2000. "The Effects of Employment Protection on the Choice of Risky Projects," Papers 00-05, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
- Glazer, A. & Kanniainen, V., 2000. "The Effects of Employment Protection on the Choice of Risky Projects," University of Helsinki, Department of Economics 487, Department of Economics.
- M13 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Administration - - - New Firms; Startups
- J23 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Demand
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1970. "Increasing risk: I. A definition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 225-243, September.
- Bentolila, Samuel & Saint-Paul, Gilles, 1992.
"A Model of Labour Demand with Linear Adjustment Costs,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
690, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Bentolila, Samuel & Saint-Paul, Gilles, 1994. "A model of labor demand with linear adjustment costs," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 303-326, September.
- Bentolila, S. & Saint-Paul, G., 1995. "A model of labour demand with linear adjustment costs," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 105-105, March.
- Bentolila, S. & Saint-Paul, G., 1992. "A Model of Labour Demand with Linear Adjustment Costs," DELTA Working Papers 92-05, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
- Glazer, A. & Kanniainen, V., 2000.
"Term Length and the Quality of Appointments,"
University of Helsinki, Department of Economics
485, Department of Economics.
- Bertola, Giuseppe, 1990. "Job security, employment and wages," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 851-879, June.
- Raquel Fonseca & Natalia Utrero, 2006. "Employment Protection Laws, Barriers to Entrepreneurship, Financial Markets and Firm Size," Working Papers 454, RAND Corporation Publications Department.
- Sebastian G. Kessing, 2006.
"Employment Protection and Product Market Competition,"
Scandinavian Journal of Economics,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 108(2), pages 339-352, 07.
- Kessing, Sebastian, 2002. "Employment protection and product market competition," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance FS IV 02-31, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
- Sebastian Kessing, 2004. "Employment Protection And Product Market Competition," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2004 50, Royal Economic Society.
- Lukach, R. & Plasmans, J.E.J., 2002. "Measuring Knowledge Spillovers using Patent Citations: Evidence from the Belgian Firm's Data," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-92281, Tilburg University.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Julio Saavedra).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.