Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Employment protection and product market competition

Contents:

Author Info

  • Kessing, Sebastian

Abstract

A firm facing employment protection will defend its market position more fiercely than a firm operating without such restrictions. However, ex ante it will be more reluctant to expand its market position. For the benchmark case of contest competition, the defensive effect dominates. A firm facing employment protection has a stronger average market position. -- Ein Unternehmen, das Kündigungsschutzbestimmungen ausgesetzt ist, verteidigt seine Marktposition stärker als ein konkurrierendes Unternehmen, das ohne derartige Restriktion agiert. Ex ante wird es jedoch vorsichtiger sein, seine Marktposition auszudehnen, da es die potentiellen Kosten im Falle einer späteren Verschlechterung der eigenen Marktposition vermeiden möchte. Für den Benchmarkfall, in dem der Wettbewerb zwischen den Unternehmen die Form eines Contests annimmt, überwiegt der defensive Effekt: Ein Unternehmen, das Kündigungsschutzbestimmungen ausgesetzt ist, hat langfristig eine stärkere Position im Markt als ein Wettbewerber der frei von solchen Restriktionen agiert.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/51152/1/363088423.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) in its series Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance with number FS IV 02-31.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:zbw:wzbmpg:fsiv0231

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Reichpietschufer 50, 10785 Berlin
Phone: +49 (0)30 25491-402
Fax: +49 (0)30 25491-400
Email:
Web page: http://www.wzb.eu/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Employment protection; contests; all-pay auction;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Giulio Fella, 2000. "Investment in General Training with Consensual Layoffs," Working Papers 418, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
  2. Stergios Skaperdas, 1996. "Contest success functions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 283-290.
  3. Konrad, Kai A, 2001. "Repeated Expropriation Contests and Foreign Direct Investment," CEPR Discussion Papers 2695, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Koeniger, Winfried, 2002. "Employment Protection, Product Market Competition and Growth," IZA Discussion Papers 554, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  5. Dan Kovenock & Michael R. Baye & Casper G. de Vries, 1996. "The all-pay auction with complete information (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 291-305.
  6. Gilles Saint Paul, 1996. "Employment protection, international specialization and innovation," Economics Working Papers 256, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised May 1997.
  7. Stergios Skaperdas & Constantinos Syropoulos, 2002. "Insecure Property and the Efficiency of Exchange," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(476), pages 133-146, January.
  8. Belot, M.V.K. & Boone, J. & Ours, J.C. van, 2002. "Welfare Effects of Employment Protection," Discussion Paper 2002-48, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  9. Dixit, Avinash K, 1987. "Strategic Behavior in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 891-98, December.
  10. Konrad, Kai A., 2000. "Trade contests," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 317-334, August.
  11. Glazer, A. & Kanniainen, V., 2000. "The Effects of Employment Protection on the Choice of Risky Projects," Papers 00-05, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Kjell Erik Lommerud & Odd Rune Straume, 2008. "Employment Protection versus Flexicurity: On Technology Adoption in Unionised Firms," CESifo Working Paper Series 2472, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Lommerud, Kjell Erik & Straume, Odd Rune, 2007. "Technology resistance and globalisation with trade unions: the choice between employment protection and flexicurity," Working Papers in Economics 13/07, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
  3. Koeniger, Winfried, 2005. "Dismissal costs and innovation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 79-84, July.
  4. Fritz Helmedag, 2005. "Möglichkeiten und Grenzen eines Beschäftigunspaktes," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), Justus-Liebig University Giessen, Department of Statistics and Economics, vol. 225(2), pages 151-162, March.
  5. Jan I. Haaland & Ian Wooton, 2007. "Domestic Labor Markets and Foreign Direct Investment," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(3), pages 462-480, 08.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:wzbmpg:fsiv0231. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.