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Term Length and the Quality of Appointments

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Author Info
Glazer, A.
Kanniainen, V.

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Abstract

Consider a pricipal who appoints an agent. Let the agent potentially serve for a sufficiently long time that one principal is replaced by another over this period. Suppose also that the quality of the agent appointed increases with the effort the incumbent principal devotes to hiring. Then the quality of the appointment may increase with the length of the agent's term. Moreover, policies such as mandatory retirement which increase a principal's consern for output after he leaves office, may induce better hiring.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics in its series University of Helsinki, Department of Economics with number 485.

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Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:helsec:485

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Postal: University of Helsinki; Department of Economics, P.O.Box 54 (Unioninkatu 37) FIN-00014 Helsingin Yliopisto
Phone: +358 9 191 8897
Fax: +358 9 191 8877
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Web page: http://www.valt.helsinki.fi/katal/
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Related research
Keywords: APPOINTMENTS LONG TERM LABOUR

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
J20 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - General
J40 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - General

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. McCubbins, Mathew D & Noll, Roger G & Weingast, Barry R, 1987. "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 243-77, Fall.
  2. Persson, Torsten, 1988. "An introduction and a broad survey," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(2-3), pages 519-532, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Harrington, Joseph Jr., 1999. "The Equilibrium Level of Rigidity in a Hierarchy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 189-202, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Moe, Terry M, 1990. "Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(0), pages 213-53.
  5. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Joseph E. Harrington & Jr., 1999. "Rigidity of Social Systems," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(1), pages 40-64, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Alesina, Alberto & Tabellini, Guido, 1988. "Credibility and politics," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(2-3), pages 542-550, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Glazer, Amihai, 1989. "Politics and the Choice of Durability," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(5), pages 1207-13, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. MacDonald, Glenn M, 1988. "The Economics of Rising Stars," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(1), pages 155-66, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Willam O. Brown, 1997. "University Governance and Academic Tenure: A Property Rights Explanation," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 153(3), pages 441-, September.
  11. Carmichael, H Lorne, 1988. "Incentives in Academics: Why Is There Tenure?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(3), pages 453-72, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Moe, Terry M, 1991. "Politics and the Theory of Organization," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 106-29, Special I.
  13. McPherson, Michael S. & Winston, Gordon C., 1983. "The economics of academic tenure : A relational perspective," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 4(2-3), pages 163-184. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2008-11-13.

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