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Term Length and the Quality of Appointments

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  • Glazer, A.
  • Kanniainen, V.

Abstract

Consider a pricipal who appoints an agent. Let the agent potentially serve for a sufficiently long time that one principal is replaced by another over this period. Suppose also that the quality of the agent appointed increases with the effort the incumbent principal devotes to hiring. Then the quality of the appointment may increase with the length of the agent's term. Moreover, policies such as mandatory retirement which increase a principal's consern for output after he leaves office, may induce better hiring.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics in its series University of Helsinki, Department of Economics with number 485.

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Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:helsec:485

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Postal: University of Helsinki; Department of Economics, P.O.Box 54 (Unioninkatu 37) FIN-00014 Helsingin Yliopisto
Phone: +358 9 191 8897
Fax: +358 9 191 8877
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Web page: http://www.helsinki.fi/politiikkajatalous/
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Keywords: APPOINTMENTS ; LONG TERM ; LABOUR;

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References

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  1. MacDonald, Glenn M, 1988. "The Economics of Rising Stars," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(1), pages 155-66, March.
  2. Moe, Terry M, 1990. "Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(0), pages 213-53.
  3. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1981. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model," NBER Working Papers 0807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Joseph E Harrington Jr, 1999. "The Equilibrium Level of Rigidity in a Hierarchy," Economics Working Paper Archive 398, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
  5. McCubbins, Mathew D & Noll, Roger G & Weingast, Barry R, 1987. "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 243-77, Fall.
  6. Joseph E. Harrington & Jr., 1999. "Rigidity of Social Systems," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(1), pages 40-64, February.
  7. Alesina, Alberto & Tabellini, Guido, 1988. "Credibility and politics," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(2-3), pages 542-550, March.
  8. McPherson, Michael S. & Winston, Gordon C., 1983. "The economics of academic tenure : A relational perspective," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 4(2-3), pages 163-184.
  9. Moe, Terry M, 1991. "Politics and the Theory of Organization," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 106-29, Special I.
  10. Willam O. Brown, 1997. "University Governance and Academic Tenure: A Property Rights Explanation," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 153(3), pages 441-, September.
  11. Carmichael, H Lorne, 1988. "Incentives in Academics: Why Is There Tenure?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(3), pages 453-72, June.
  12. Persson, Torsten, 1988. "An introduction and a broad survey," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(2-3), pages 519-532, March.
  13. Glazer, Amihai, 1989. "Politics and the Choice of Durability," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(5), pages 1207-13, December.
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Cited by:
  1. Glazer, A. & Kanniainen, V., 2000. "The Effects of Employment Protection on the Choice of Risky Projects," University of Helsinki, Department of Economics 487, Department of Economics.

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