Investment in General Training with Consensual Layoffs
AbstractWe study non-contractible firms' investment in general training in a model of frictional unemployment. Since training is vested in workers, firms' return to training is zero when a match ends. Consensual layoff provisions or large severance payments oblige firms to bargain efficiently over the joint payoff from separation. This increases employers' incentives to train as they share workers' outside return to general human capital. The result generalizes to all types of general investment that are vested in the non-investing party on separation. We also show that, independently from underinvestment in training, the laissez-faire equilibrium is always inefficient for any given level of investment.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance in its series Working Papers with number 418.
Date of creation: Oct 2000
Date of revision:
Consensual layoffs; General training; Matching;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
- J63 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
- J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
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