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"Where Ignorance is Bliss, 'tis Folly to be Wise": Transparency in Contests

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  • Denter, Philipp

    ()

  • Morgan, John

    ()

  • Sisak, Dana

    ()

Abstract

Increasingly, lobbying groups are subject to transparency requirements, obliging them to provide detailed information about their business. We study the effect this transparency policy has on the nature of lobbying competition. Under mild conditions, mandated transparency leads to an increase in wastefulness of lobbying competition and a decline in expected allocative efficiency. Hence we identify a negative side-effect of transparency policy, which also has implications for various other fields such as political campaigning or firm competition.

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File URL: http://www1.vwa.unisg.ch/RePEc/usg/econwp/EWP-1128.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science in its series Economics Working Paper Series with number 1128.

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Length: 44 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:usg:econwp:2011:28

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Keywords: Transparency Policy; Rent-seeking Contests; Information Disclosure; Value of Ignorance;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Baumann, Florian & Denter, Philipp & Friehe, Tim, 2013. "Hide or show? Endogenous observability of private precautions against crime when property value is private information," DICE Discussion Papers, Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) 115, Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
  2. Philipp Denter & Dana Sisak, 2010. ""Who's the thief?": Asymmetric Information and the Creation of Property Rights," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2010, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen 2010-27, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen.
  3. Denter, Philipp & Sisak, Dana, 2013. "Do Polls Create Momentum in Political Campaigns?," Economics Working Paper Series, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science 1326, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
  4. Ezra Einy & Diego Moreno & Benyamin Shitovitz, 2014. "The value of public information in common value Tullock contests," Economics Working Papers we1401, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía, revised Mar 2014.

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