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• John Morgan

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Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 116 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (July)
Pages: 1-18
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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:116:y:2003:i:1-2:p:1-18

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Related research

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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

1. Qiang Fu, 2006. "Endogenous timing of contest with asymmetric information," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(1), pages 1-23, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Oliver Gürtler, 2006. "Contractual Incentive Provision and Commitment in Rent-Seeking Contests," Discussion Papers 100, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
3. Oliver Gürtler, 2005. "Rent seeking in sequential group contests," Discussion Papers 47, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Oliver Gürtler, 2005. "Rent seeking in sequential group contests," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse2_2005, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
4. Rob van der Noll, 2006. "Competition for a Prize," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-013/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
5. Zhou, J., 2007. "In Litigation: How Far do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead?," Discussion Paper 2007-002, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Zhou, J., 2007. "In Litigation: How Far do the ?Haves? Come Out Ahead," Discussion Paper 2007-10, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
6. Felix Várdy & John Morgan, 2005. "The Value of Commitment in Contests and Tournaments when Observation is Costly," Public Economics 0504005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Morgan, John & Vardy, Felix, 2007. "The value of commitment in contests and tournaments when observation is costly," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 326-338, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Oliver Gürtler, 2006. "Haggling for Rents, Relational Contracts, and the Theory of the Firm," Discussion Papers 169, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.