Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

The Generalized Stackelberg Equilibrium of the All-Pay Auction with Complete Information

Contents:

Author Info

  • Kai A. Konrad
  • Wolfgang Leininger

Abstract

We characterize the equilibrium of the all-pay auction with general convex cost of effort and sequential effort choices. We consider a set of n players who are arbitrarily partitioned into a group of players who choose their efforts ’early’ and a group of players who choose ’late’. Only the player with the lowest cost of effort has a positive payoff in any equilibrium. This payoff depends on his own timing vis-a-vis the timing of others. We also show that the choice of timing can be endogenized, in which case the strongest player typically chooses ’late’, whereas all other players are indifferent with respect to their choice of timing. In the most prominent equilibrium the player with the lowest cost of effort wins the auction at zero aggregate cost.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-CESifo_Working_Papers/wp-cesifo-2005/wp-cesifo-2005-11/cesifo1_wp1609.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 1609.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1609

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Poschingerstrasse 5, 81679 Munich
Phone: +49 (89) 9224-0
Fax: +49 (89) 985369
Email:
Web page: http://www.cesifo.de
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: sequential all-pay auction; complete information; generalized cost; generalized Stackelberg game;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Arye Hillman & Dov Samet, 1987. "Dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 63-82, January.
  2. Konrad, Kai A, 2001. "Investment in the Absence of Property Rights: The Role of Incumbency Advantages," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 3050, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Kaplan, T.R. & Luski, I. & Wettstein, D., 2000. "Innovative Activity and Sunk Cost," Papers, Tel Aviv 2000-6, Tel Aviv.
  4. Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper G. de Vries, 2000. "Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction-Theoretic Approach," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 00-103/2, Tinbergen Institute.
  5. Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C., 1992. "The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information," Papers, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics 8-92-1, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
  6. Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2002. "Asymmetric Contests with General Technologies," Keele Economics Research Papers, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University KERP 2002/22, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University.
  7. Deneckere, R. & Kovenock, D. & Lee, R.E., 1988. "A Model of Price Leadership Based on Consumer Loyalty," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 947, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
  8. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1989. "Politically Contestable Rents And Transfers," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 17-39, 03.
  9. Baik, Kyung H & Shogren, Jason F, 1992. "Strategic Behavior in Contests: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 359-62, March.
  10. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 2001. "Markov Perfect Equilibrium: I. Observable Actions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 191-219, October.
  11. Muller, Holger M & Warneryd, Karl, 2001. "Inside versus Outside Ownership: A Political Theory of the Firm," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(3), pages 527-41, Autumn.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Gürtler, Oliver, 2006. "Contractual Incentive Provision and Commitment in Rent-Seeking Contests," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University 100, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  2. Segev, Ella & Sela, Aner, 2011. "Sequential All-Pay Auctions with Head Starts," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 8183, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Baumann, Florian & Denter, Philipp & Friehe, Tim, 2013. "Hide or show? Endogenous observability of private precautions against crime when property value is private information," DICE Discussion Papers 115, Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
  4. Francoise Forges & Frédéric Koessler, 2006. "Long Persuasion Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 1669, CESifo Group Munich.
  5. Florian Baumann & Tim Friehe, 2013. "A note on the timing of investments in litigation contests," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 313-326, June.
  6. Grégoire Rota-Graziosi & Magnus Hoffmann, 2011. "Endogenous Timing in General Rent‐Seeking and Conflict Models," Working Papers halshs-00553119, HAL.
  7. Hirata, Daisuke, 2014. "A model of a two-stage all-pay auction," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 5-13.
  8. Ella Segev & Aner Sela, 2011. "Sequential All-Pay Auctions with Head Starts and Noisy Outputs," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics 1106, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
  9. Aner Sela & Ella Segev, 2012. "Multi-Stage Sequential All-Pay Auctions," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics 1211, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
  10. Kai Konrad & Wolfgang Leininger, 2011. "Self-enforcing norms and efficient non-cooperative collective action in the provision of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 146(3), pages 501-520, March.
  11. Brennan C. Platt & Joseph Price & Henry Tappen, 2010. "Pay-to-Bid Auctions," NBER Working Papers 15695, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Kai A. Konrad & Wolfgang Leininger, 2007. "Self-enforcing Norms and the Efficient Non-cooperative Organization of Clans," Ruhr Economic Papers, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen 0016, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
  13. Chiappinelli, Olga, 2014. "An elimination contest with non-sunk bids," MPRA Paper 56140, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  14. Denter, Philipp & Morgan, John & Sisak, Dana, 2011. ""Where Ignorance is Bliss, 'tis Folly to be Wise": Transparency in Contests," Economics Working Paper Series 1128, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
  15. Konrad, Kai A., 2010. "Dynamic contests," Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" SP II 2010-10, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1609. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Julio Saavedra).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.