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Nine points of the law: evidentiary rules and the costs of litigation

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  • Karl Wärneryd

Abstract

If the defendant in a lawsuit is better informed than the plaintiff about the value of damages that could potentially be assigned by the court, biasing the burden of proof toward the plaintiff may lower aggregate efficiency losses from litigation. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

Suggested Citation

  • Karl Wärneryd, 2012. "Nine points of the law: evidentiary rules and the costs of litigation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 153(3), pages 279-285, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:153:y:2012:i:3:p:279-285
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-011-9793-z
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Tullock, Gordon, 1975. "On the Efficient Organization of Trials," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(4), pages 745-762.
    2. Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper G. Vries, 2005. "Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction-Theoretic Approach," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(505), pages 583-601, July.
    3. Hirshleifer, Jack & Osborne, Evan, 2001. "Truth, Effort, and the Legal Battle," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 108(1-2), pages 169-195, July.
    4. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Francesco Parisi, 2005. "Rents, dissipation and lost treasures: Rethinking Tullock's paradox," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 411-422, September.
    5. Dan Kovenock & Michael R. Baye & Casper G. de Vries, 1996. "The all-pay auction with complete information (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(2), pages 291-305.
    6. Konrad, Kai A., 2002. "Investment in the absence of property rights; the role of incumbency advantages," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(8), pages 1521-1537, September.
    7. Hay, Bruce L & Spier, Kathryn E, 1997. "Burdens of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Economic Perspective," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 413-431, June.
    8. Bernardo, Antonio E & Talley, Eric & Welch, Ivo, 2000. "A Theory of Legal Presumptions," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(1), pages 1-49, April.
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    10. Warneryd, Karl, 2000. "In Defense of Lawyers: Moral Hazard as an Aid to Cooperation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 145-158, October.
    11. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1989. "Politically Contestable Rents And Transfers," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 17-39, March.
    12. Gordon Tullock, 1975. "On The Efficient Organization Of Trials," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(4), pages 745-762, November.
    13. Chris William Sanchirico, 2008. "A Primary-Activity Approach to Proof Burdens," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(1), pages 273-313, January.
    14. Warneryd, Karl, 2003. "Information in conflicts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 121-136, May.
    15. Katz, Avery, 1988. "Judicial decisionmaking and litigation expenditure," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 127-143, December.
    16. Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John, 1997. "An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 343-362, February.
    17. Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 1999. "Legal Expenditure as a Rent-Seeking Game," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 100(3-4), pages 271-288, September.
    18. Sanchirico, Chris William, 1997. "The burden of proof in civil litigation: A simple model of mechanism design," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 431-447, September.
    19. Parisi, Francesco, 2002. "Rent-seeking through litigation: adversarial and inquisitorial systems compared," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 193-216, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Chulyoung Kim, 2014. "Adversarial and Inquisitorial Procedures with Information Acquisition," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 30(4), pages 767-803.
    2. Wang Lin, 2018. "The Effect of Compensation System on the Dispute Resolution of Securities False Statement in China: A Law and Economics Analysis," Asian Journal of Law and Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(3), pages 1-9, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Litigation; Asymmetric information; Burden of proof; Contest; C72; D72; D82; K41;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process

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