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Employment Protection Versus Flexicurity: On Technology Adoption in Unionised Firms

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  • Kjell Erik Lommerud
  • Odd Rune Straume

Abstract

We analyse how different labour market institutions--employment protection versus ‘flexicurity’--affect technology adoption in unionised firms. We consider trade unions’ incentives to oppose or endorse labour-saving technology and firms’ incentives to invest in such technology. Increased flexicurity--interpreted as less employment protection and a higher reservation wage for workers--unambiguously increases firms’ incentives for technology adoption. If unions have some direct influence on technology, a higher reservation wage also makes unions more willing to accept technological change. Less employment protection has the opposite effect, since this increases the downside (job losses) of labour-saving technology.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Scandinavian Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 114 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (03)
Pages: 177-199

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Handle: RePEc:bla:scandj:v:114:y:2012:i:1:p:177-199

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Web page: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1467-9442

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Lommerud, Kjell Erik & Meland, Frode & Straume, Odd Rune, 2012. "North–South technology transfer in unionised multinationals," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 385-395.
  2. Ippei Shibata, 2013. "Is Labor Market Mismatch a Big Deal in Japan?," IMF Working Papers 13/196, International Monetary Fund.
  3. Andersen, Torben M, 2010. "Incentive and Insurance Effects of Tax Financed Unemployment Insurance," CEPR Discussion Papers 8025, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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