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Citations for ""Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring''"

by George Mailath & Stephen Morris

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  1. Olivier Compte & Andrew Postlewaite, 2015. "Plausible cooperation," Post-Print halshs-01204780, HAL.
  2. Rich McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite, 2005. "Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000261, UCLA Department of Economics.
  3. Christopher Phelan & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2007. "Private Monitoring with Infinite Histories," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 843644000000000079, www.najecon.org.
  4. V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2009. "A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 09-029, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  5. Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2012. "Characterizing belief-free review-strategy equilibrium payoffs under conditional independence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1998-2027.
  6. Eiichi Miyagawa & Yasuyuki Miyahara & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2004. "The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Observation Costs," KIER Working Papers 597, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
  7. Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2008. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation, and Debt," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 201-36, March.
  8. Roman, Mihai Daniel, 2008. "Entreprises behavior in cooperative and punishment‘s repeated negotiations," MPRA Paper 37527, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 05 Jan 2009.
  9. Olivier Gossner & Jöhannes Horner, 2006. "When is the individually rational payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?," Discussion Papers 1440, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  10. Aldy, Joseph Edgar, 2012. "Designing a Bretton Woods Institution to Address Climate Change," Scholarly Articles 8830777, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
  11. Wojciech Olszewski & Johannes Horner, 2008. "How Robust is the Folk Theorem with Imperfect," 2008 Meeting Papers 895, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  12. Olivier Compte & Andrew Postlewaite, 2010. "Plausible Cooperation,Third Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-008, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Dec 2012.
  13. Aoyagi, Masaki, 2002. "Collusion in Dynamic Bertrand Oligopoly with Correlated Private Signals and Communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 229-248, January.
  14. Heller, Yuval, 2015. "Instability of Equilibria with Imperfect Private Monitoring," MPRA Paper 64468, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  15. V. Bhaskar & Eric van Damme, 1998. "Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring," Game Theory and Information 9809004, EconWPA.
  16. Ichiro Obara, 2005. "Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games (with R. McLean and A. Postlewaite)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 365, UCLA Department of Economics.
  17. Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2009. "A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 802-824, March.
  18. Fudenberg, Drew & Ishii, Yuhta & Kominers, Scott Duke, 2014. "Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 487-514.
  19. Compte, Olivier, 2002. "On Failing to Cooperate When Monitoring Is Private," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 151-188, January.
  20. Stephen Morris & George J Mailath, 2005. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," 2005 Meeting Papers 25, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  21. Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 2002. "Existence of nontrivial equilibria in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 299-321, August.
  22. Ichiro Obara, 2005. "Folk Theorem with Communication," UCLA Economics Online Papers 366, UCLA Department of Economics.
  23. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2003. "Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-242, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  24. Jeffrey C. Ely, 2000. "Correlated Equilibrium and Private Monitoring," Discussion Papers 1265, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  25. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 2007. "The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games," Scholarly Articles 3203772, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  26. Ichiro Obara, 2000. "Private Strategy and Efficiency: Repeated Partnership Games Revisited," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1449, Econometric Society.
  27. Andrew Postlewaite & Olivier Compte, 2008. "Repeated Relationships with Limits on Information Processing," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-026, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  28. repec:pra:mprapa:64485 is not listed on IDEAS
  29. Barlo, Mehmet & Carmona, Guilherme & Sabourian, Hamid, 2009. "Repeated games with one-memory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 312-336, January.
  30. Compte, Olivier, 2002. "On Sustaining Cooperation without Public Observations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 106-150, January.
  31. V. Bhaskar & Ichiro Obara, . "Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring," Penn CARESS Working Papers d93eb6f40c65728f9e1a7b114, Penn Economics Department.
  32. Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2006. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(2), pages 499-519, 03.
  33. Johannes Horner & Olivier Gossner, 2007. "Private Monitoring without Conditional Independence," 2007 Meeting Papers 860, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  34. George J. Mailath & : Wojciech Olszewski, 2008. "Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-027, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 28 Jul 2008.
  35. Phelan, Christopher & Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2015. "Recall and private monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 162-170.
  36. Cole, Harold L. & Kocherlakota, Narayana R., 2005. "Finite memory and imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 59-72, October.
  37. Doraszelski, Ulrich & Escobar, Juan F., 2012. "Restricted feedback in long term relationships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 142-161.
  38. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2012. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-044, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  39. Jeffery Ely & Johannes Horner & Wojciech Olszewski, 2004. "Strategic Commitment Versus Flexibility in a Duopoloy with Entry and Exit," Discussion Papers 1381, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  40. George J. Mailath & Wojciech Olszewski, 2008. "Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-019, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  41. Sugaya, Takuo & Takahashi, Satoru, 2013. "Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 1891-1928.
  42. Cho, Myeonghwan, 2011. "Public randomization in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game with local interaction," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 112(3), pages 280-282, September.
  43. Takizawa, Shinichiro, 2010. "Private monitoring games and decisions under uncertainty," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(3), pages 337-340, September.
  44. Ichiro Obara, 2004. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies (with M. Kandori)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 281, UCLA Department of Economics.
  45. Fong, Kyna & Sannikov, Yuliy, 2007. "Efficiency in a Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt8vz4q9tr, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  46. Michihiro Kandori, 2001. "Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-114, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  47. Zhang, Wenzhang & Chan, Jimmy H., 0. "Approximate efficiency in repeated games with side-payments and correlated signals," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
  48. Zheng, Bingyong, 2008. "Approximate efficiency in repeated games with correlated private signals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 406-416, May.
  49. Michihiro Kandori, 2007. "Weakly Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-491, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  50. Filip Vesely & Chun-Lei Yang, 2013. "On Optimal Social Convention in Voluntary Continuation Prisoner's Dilemma Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 4553, CESifo Group Munich.
  51. McLean, Richard & Obara, Ichiro & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2014. "Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 191-212.
  52. Fudenberg, Drew & Olszewski, Wojciech, 2011. "Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 86-99, May.
  53. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2013. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-038, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
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