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Promotion, Turnover, Earnings, and Firm-Sponsored Training

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Naoki Mitani & Akira Wakisaka & Atsushi Morimoto, 2017. "Why Women’s Share among Managers Is So Low in Japan: A Statistical Fallacy or A Shadow of the Employment System?," International Journal of Economic Policy Studies, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 42-68, January.
  2. Dickmanns, Lisa & Gürtler, Marc & Gürtler, Oliver, 2018. "Market-based tournaments: An experimental investigation," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 294-306.
  3. Oliver Gürtler & Lennart Struth, 2021. "Do Workers Benefit from Wage Transparency Rules?," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 105, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
  4. Kato, Takao & Ogawa, Hiromasa & Owan, Hideo, 2016. "Working Hours, Promotion and the Gender Gap in the Workplace," IZA Discussion Papers 10454, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  5. Dato, Simon & Grunewald, Andreas & Kräkel, Matthias & Müller, Daniel, 2016. "Asymmetric employer information, promotions, and the wage policy of firms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 273-300.
  6. Fumitaka Nakamura & Nao Sudo & Yu Sugisaki, 2021. "Monetary Policy Shocks and the Employment of Young, Middle-Aged, and Old Workers," IMES Discussion Paper Series 21-E-06, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan.
  7. Michael Waldman & Ori Zax, 2016. "An Exploration of the Promotion Signaling Distortion," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 32(1), pages 119-149.
  8. Suman Ghosh & Michael Waldman, 2010. "Standard promotion practices versus up‐or‐out contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(2), pages 301-325, June.
  9. Bastani, Spencer & Giebe, Thomas & Gürtler, Oliver, 2022. "Simple equilibria in general contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 264-280.
  10. Jed DeVaro & Antti Kauhanen, 2016. "An “Opposing Responses” Test of Classic versus Market-Based Promotion Tournaments," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(3), pages 747-779.
  11. Kameshwari Shankar & Suman Ghosh, 2005. "Favorable Selection in the Labor Market: A Theory of Worker Mobility in R&D Intensive Industries," Working Papers 05006, Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University.
  12. Xin Jin, 2014. "The Signaling Role of Not Being Promoted: Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 0314, University of South Florida, Department of Economics.
  13. Bas Klaauw & António Dias da Silva, 2011. "Wage dynamics and promotions inside and between firms," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 24(4), pages 1513-1548, October.
  14. Junichiro Ishida, 2012. "Dynamically Sabotage-Proof Tournaments," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(3), pages 627-655.
  15. Ekinci, Emre, 2022. "Employee entrepreneurship and signaling role of corporate venturing decisions," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
  16. Jed DeVaro & Antti Kauhanen & Nelli Valmari, 2019. "Internal and External Hiring," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 72(4), pages 981-1008, August.
  17. Alexander K. Koch & Eloïc Peyrache, 2011. "Aligning Ambition and Incentives," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 27(3), pages 655-688.
  18. Elizabeth Davis & Matthew Freedman & Julia Lane & Brian McCall & Nicole Nestoriak & Timothy Park, "undated". "Product Market Competition and Human Resource Practices: An Analysis of the Retail Food Sector," Working Papers 0905, Human Resources and Labor Studies, University of Minnesota (Twin Cities Campus).
  19. Frank MacCrory & Vidyanand Choudhary & Alain Pinsonneault, 2016. "Research Note—Designing Promotion Ladders to Mitigate Turnover of IT Professionals," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 27(3), pages 648-660, September.
  20. Junichiro Ishida, 2012. "Promotion without Commitment: Signaling, Time Inconsistency and Decentralization of the Firm," ISER Discussion Paper 0843, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka.
  21. BÃ¥rd Harstad, 2007. "Organizational Form and the Market for Talent," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(3), pages 581-611.
  22. Waldman, Michael, 2013. "Classic promotion tournaments versus market-based tournaments," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 198-210.
  23. Jed DeVaro & Suman Ghosh & Cindy Zoghi, 2018. "Job Characteristics and Labor Market Discrimination in Promotions," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(3), pages 389-434, July.
  24. Jonathan Morris & Rick Delbridge & Takahiro Endo, 2018. "The Layering of Meso‐Level Institutional Effects on Employment Systems in Japan," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 56(3), pages 603-630, September.
  25. Jed DeVaro & Hodaka Morita, 2013. "Internal Promotion and External Recruitment: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(2), pages 227-269.
  26. Jed DeVaro & Michael Waldman, 2012. "The Signaling Role of Promotions: Further Theory and Empirical Evidence," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 91-147.
  27. MORITA, Hodaka & TANG, Cheng-Tao, 2017. "Asset Specificity, Human Capital Acquisition, and Labor Market Competition," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-42, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
  28. Núria Rodríguez-Planas, 2015. "Displacement, Signaling, and Recall Expectations," Working Papers 550, Barcelona School of Economics.
  29. Balmaceda, Felipe, 2021. "A failure of the market for college education and on-the-job human capital," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
  30. Bilanakos, Christos, 2013. "Career concerns and firm – sponsored general training," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 117-132.
  31. Cassidy, Hugh & DeVaro, Jed & Kauhanen, Antti, 2016. "Promotion signaling, gender, and turnover: New theory and evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 126(PA), pages 140-166.
  32. Jin, Xin, 2014. "The Signaling Role of Note Being Promoted: Theory and Evidence," MPRA Paper 58484, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  33. DeVaro, Jed, 2011. "Using "opposing responses" and relative performance to distinguish empirically among alternative models of promotions," MPRA Paper 35175, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  34. Prasad, Suraj & Tran, Hien, 2013. "Work practices, incentives for skills, and training," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 66-76.
  35. Atsuko Tanaka, "undated". "Employer Loyalty, Training, and Female Labor Supply," Working Papers 2015-27, Department of Economics, University of Calgary, revised 25 Mar 2016.
  36. Christian Deutscher & Oliver Gürtler & Joachim Prinz & Daniel Weimar, 2017. "The Payoff To Consistency In Performance," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(2), pages 1091-1103, April.
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