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How to Organize Crime -super-1

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Meier, Stephan & Pierce, Lamar & Vaccaro, Antonino, 2014. "Trust and In-Group Favoritism in a Culture of Crime," IZA Discussion Papers 8169, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  2. Giovanni Mastrobuoni, 2013. "The Value of Connections: Evidence from the Italian-American Mafia," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 335, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
  3. Meier, Stephan & Pierce, Lamar & Vaccaro, Antonino & La Cara, Barbara, 2016. "Trust and in-group favoritism in a culture of crime," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 132(PA), pages 78-92.
  4. Belhaj, Mohamed & Deroïan, Frédéric, 2018. "Targeting the key player: An incentive-based approach," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 57-64.
  5. Marcin Dziubinski & Sanjeev Goyal & Adrien Vigier, 2015. "Conflict and Networks," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1565, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  6. Bloch, Francis & Dutta, Bhaskar & Dziubiński, Marcin, 2020. "A game of hide and seek in networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
  7. Sunghoon Hong & Myrna Wooders, 2010. "Strategic Network Interdiction," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 1010, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  8. Emilie Dargaud & Armel Jacques, 2015. "Endogenous firms’ organization, internal audit and leniency programs," Working Papers 1524, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
  9. Guido Friebel & Sergei Guriev, 2012. "Whistle‐Blowing and Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(4), pages 1007-1027, December.
  10. Emilie Dargaud & Armel Jacques, 2015. "Hidden collusion by decentralization: firm organization and antitrust policy," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 114(2), pages 153-176, March.
  11. Bravard, Christophe & Charroin, Liza & Touati, Corinne, 2017. "Optimal design and defense of networks under link attacks," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 62-79.
  12. Sanjeev Goyal & Adrien Vigier, 2014. "Attack, Defence, and Contagion in Networks," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 81(4), pages 1518-1542.
  13. Salvatore Piccolo & Giovanni Immordino, 2012. "Optimal Accomplice-Witnesses Regulation under Asymmetric Information," CSEF Working Papers 304, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  14. Dziubiński, Marcin Konrad & Goyal, Sanjeev, 2017. "How do you defend a network?," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(1), January.
  15. Long, Iain W., 2013. "Recruitment to Organised Crime," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2013/10, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
  16. Mariagiovanna Baccara, 2007. "Outsourcing, information leakage, and consulting firms," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(1), pages 269-289, March.
  17. Cerdeiro, Diego A. & Dziubiński, Marcin & Goyal, Sanjeev, 2017. "Individual security, contagion, and network design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 182-226.
  18. B. Hoyer, 2012. "Network Disruption and the Common Enemy Effect," Working Papers 12-06, Utrecht School of Economics.
  19. Dziubiński, Marcin & Goyal, Sanjeev, 2013. "Network design and defence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 30-43.
  20. Levine, Emma E. & Schweitzer, Maurice E., 2015. "Prosocial lies: When deception breeds trust," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 88-106.
  21. D’Hernoncourt, Johanna & Méon, Pierre-Guillaume, 2012. "The not so dark side of trust: Does trust increase the size of the shadow economy?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 97-121.
  22. Maria Bigoni & Sven-Olof Fridolfsson & Chloé Le Coq & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2015. "Trust, Leniency, and Deterrence," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 31(4), pages 663-689.
  23. Mastrobuoni Giovanni & Patacchini Eleonora, 2012. "Organized Crime Networks: an Application of Network Analysis Techniques to the American Mafia," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(3), pages 1-43, September.
  24. Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof & Le Coq, Chloé & Bigoni, Maria, 2012. "Trust and Deterrence," CEPR Discussion Papers 9002, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  25. Marcin Dziubinski & Sanjeev Goyal, 2014. "How to Defend a Network?," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1450, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  26. Gamba, Astrid & Immordino, Giovanni & Piccolo, Salvatore, 2018. "Corruption, organized crime and the bright side of subversion of law," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 79-88.
  27. Carlos Ponce & Flavia Roldán, 2016. "How a cartel operates: evidence from Graphite Electrode cartel from a social network perspective," Documentos de Investigación 113, Universidad ORT Uruguay. Facultad de Administración y Ciencias Sociales.
  28. Acemoglu, Daron & Malekian, Azarakhsh & Ozdaglar, Asu, 2016. "Network security and contagion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 536-585.
  29. Giovanni Immordino & Salvatore Piccolo & Paolo Roberti, 2018. "Optimal Leniency and the Organization Design of Group Delinquency," CSEF Working Papers 503, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  30. Iain W. Long, 2017. "The Storm Before the Calm? Adverse Effects of Tackling Organized Crime," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 85(5), pages 541-576, September.
  31. Diego Cerdeiro & Marcin Dziubinski & Sanjeev Goyal, 2015. "Contagion Risk and Network Design," Working Papers 2015.56, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  32. Michel Grabisch & Agnieszka Rusinowska & Xavier Venel, 2019. "Diffusion in countably infinite networks," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 19017, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
  33. Bernales, Alejandro & Beuermann, Diether W. & Cumming, Douglas & Olid, Christian, 2023. "Blue-Collar Crime and Finance," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
  34. Paolo Buccirossi & Giovanni Immordino & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2021. "Whistleblower rewards, false reports, and corporate fraud," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 51(3), pages 411-431, June.
  35. Immordino, Giovanni & Piccolo, Salvatore & Roberti, Paolo, 2020. "Optimal leniency and the organization design of group crime," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
  36. María C. Avramovich, 2020. "The Welfare Implications of the Meeting Design of a Cartel," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 57(1), pages 59-83, August.
  37. Ferrali, Romain, 2020. "Partners in crime? Corruption as a criminal network," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 319-353.
  38. Giovanni Mastrobuoni & Eleonora Patacchini, 2010. "Understanding Organized Crime Networks: Evidence Based on Federal Bureau of Narcotics Secret Files on American Mafia," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 152, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
  39. Charles H. Anderton & Jurgen Brauer, 2018. "The Onset, Spread, and Prevention of Mass Atrocities:Perspectives from Network Models," Working Papers 1810, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics.
  40. Charles H. Anderton & Jurgen Brauer, 2018. "The Onset, Spread, and Prevention of Mass Atrocities:Perspectives from Network Models," Working Papers 1810, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics.
  41. Giovanni Immordino & Salvatore Piccolo & Paolo Roberti, 2018. "Criminal Networks, Market Externalities and Optimal Leniency," CSEF Working Papers 519, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  42. Goyal, S., 2016. "Networks and Markets," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1652, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  43. McBride, Michael & Hewitt, David, 2013. "The enemy you can’t see: An investigation of the disruption of dark networks," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 32-50.
  44. Xiang, Wang, 2020. "Who will watch the watchers? On optimal monitoring networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
  45. DeAngelo, Gregory, 2012. "Making space for crime: A spatial analysis of criminal competition," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1-2), pages 42-51.
  46. Deng, Liuchun & Sun, Yufeng, 2017. "Criminal network formation and optimal detection policy: The role of cascade of detection," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 43-63.
  47. Ken Yahagi, 2019. "Law enforcement with criminal organizations and endogenous collaboration," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 48(3), pages 351-363, December.
  48. Schram, Peter, 2021. "Self-managing terror: Resolving agency problems with diverse teams," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 240-257.
  49. Michele Battisti & Andrea Mario Lavezzi & Roberto Musotto, 2022. "Organizing Crime: an Empirical Analysis of the Sicilian Mafia," Papers 2205.02310, arXiv.org.
  50. Luís Cabral, 2005. "Collusion Theory: Where to Go Next?," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 199-206, December.
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