Strategic Network Interdiction
We develop a strategic model of network interdiction in a non-cooperative game of flow. A security agency operates a network with arc capacities. An adversary, endowed with a bounded quantity of bads, chooses a flow that specifies a plan for carrying bads through the network from a base to a target. Simultaneously, the agency chooses a blockage, which specifies a plan for blocking the transport of bads through arcs in the network. However, the blockage of arcs disrupts the operation of the network. The adversary gains and the agency loses from the target damage and the network disruption. The adversary incurs the expense of carrying bads. We characterize the Nash equilibria in terms of the primitives of our model. Our model contributes to the literature of game theory by introducing non-cooperative behavior into a Kalai-Zemel type mode of a (cooperative) game of flow. Our research also advances models and results on network interdiction.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2010|
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Heski Bar-Isaac & Mariagiovanna Baccara, 2008. "Interrogation Methods and Terror Networks," Working Papers 08-8, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
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- Aaron Clauset & Maxwell Young & Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, 2007. "On the Frequency of Severe Terrorist Events," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 51(1), pages 58-87, February.
- Mariagiovanna Baccara & Heski Bar-Isaac, 2008. "How to Organize Crime -super-1," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(4), pages 1039-1067.
- Heski Bar-Isaac & Mariagiovanna Baccara, 2006. "How to Organize Crime," Working Papers 06-07, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Reijnierse, Hans & Maschler, Michael & Potters, Jos & Tijs, Stef, 1996. "Simple Flow Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 238-260, October.
- Potters, Jos & Reijnierse, Hans & Biswas, Amit, 2006. "The nucleolus of balanced simple flow networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 205-225, January. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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