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A game of hide and seek in networks

Author

Listed:
  • Francis Bloch

    (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

  • Bhaskar Dutta

    (University of Warwick [Coventry], Ashoka University)

  • Marcin Dziubiński

    (UW - Uniwersytet Warszawski [Polska] = University of Warsaw [Poland] = Université de Varsovie [Pologne])

Abstract

We propose and study a strategic model of hiding in a network, where the network designer chooses the links and his position in the network facing the seeker who inspects and disrupts the network. We characterize optimal networks for the hider, as well as equilibrium hiding and seeking strategies on these networks. We show that optimal networks are either equivalent to cycles or variants of core-periphery networks where every node in the periphery is connected to a single node in the core.

Suggested Citation

  • Francis Bloch & Bhaskar Dutta & Marcin Dziubiński, 2020. "A game of hide and seek in networks," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-03230063, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-03230063
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105119
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    Cited by:

    1. Francis Bloch & Bhaskar Dutta & Marcin Dziubi´nski, 2024. "Strategic hiding and exploration in networks," Working Papers 112, Ashoka University, Department of Economics.
    2. Chang, Jin-Wook & Jayachandran, Kartik & Ramírez, Carlos A. & Tintera, Ali, 2024. "On the anatomy of cyberattacks," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 238(C).
    3. Daniel Woods & Mustafa Abdallah & Saurabh Bagchi & Shreyas Sundaram & Timothy Cason, 2022. "Network defense and behavioral biases: an experimental study," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(1), pages 254-286, February.
    4. Bloch, Francis & Chatterjee, Kalyan & Dutta, Bhaskar, 2023. "Attack and interception in networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(4), November.
    5. Francis Bloch & Bhaskar Dutta & Marcin Dziubi'nski, 2025. "Strategic hiding and exploration in networks," Papers 2510.16994, arXiv.org.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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