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Signaling and mediation in games with common interest

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Sugaya, Takuo & Wolitzky, Alexander, 2017. "Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.
  2. Mira Frick & Ryota Iijima & Yuhta Ishii, 2021. "Learning Efficiency of Multi-Agent Information Structures," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2299R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Dec 2021.
  3. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013. "The Comparison of Information Structures in Games: Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000730, David K. Levine.
  4. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2014. "Informational Robustness and Solution Concepts," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1973, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  5. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013. "Robust Predictions in Games With Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(4), pages 1251-1308, July.
  6. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2019. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 57(1), pages 44-95, March.
  7. Takashi Ui & Stephen Morris, 2020. "Incomplete Information Robustness," Working Papers on Central Bank Communication 019, University of Tokyo, Graduate School of Economics.
  8. Alvarez, Fernando & Barlevy, Gadi, 2021. "Mandatory disclosure and financial contagion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
  9. Mark Whitmeyer, 2020. "In Simple Communication Games, When Does Ex Ante Fact-Finding Benefit the Receiver?," Papers 2001.09387, arXiv.org.
  10. Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen, 2017. "Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 744-759.
  11. Fabrizio Germano & Peio Zuazo-Garin, 2017. "Bounded rationality and correlated equilibria," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(3), pages 595-629, August.
  12. Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen, 2016. "Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(2), May.
  13. Kolotilin, Anton, 2015. "Experimental design to persuade," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 215-226.
  14. Tang, Qianfeng, 2015. "Hierarchies of beliefs and the belief-invariant Bayesian solution," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 111-116.
  15. Dughmi, Shaddin, 2019. "On the hardness of designing public signals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 609-625.
  16. Yuval Heller & Eyal Winter, 2016. "Rule Rationality," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 57(3), pages 997-1026, August.
  17. Wu, Wenhao, 2023. "A geometric Blackwell’s order," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
  18. Lehrer, Ehud & Rosenberg, Dinah & Shmaya, Eran, 2013. "Garbling of signals and outcome equivalence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 179-191.
  19. Bernard Herskovic & João Ramos, 2020. "Acquiring Information through Peers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(7), pages 2128-2152, July.
  20. Cédric Wanko, 2018. "A Unique and Stable $$\hbox {Se}{\mathcal {C}}\hbox {ure}$$ Se C ure Reversion Protocol Improving Efficiency: A Computational Bayesian Approach for Empirical Analysis," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 52(1), pages 1-23, June.
  21. Chady Jabbour & Anis Hoayek & Jean-Michel Salles, 2022. "Formalizing a Two-Step Decision-Making Process in Land Use: Evidence from Controlling Forest Clearcutting Using Spatial Information," Land, MDPI, vol. 12(1), pages 1-17, December.
  22. Taneva, Ina A, 2015. "Information Design," SIRE Discussion Papers 2015-50, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
  23. de Oliveira, Henrique, 2018. "Blackwell's informativeness theorem using diagrams," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 126-131.
  24. Françoise Forges, 2006. "Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information Revisited," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 61(4), pages 329-344, December.
  25. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2011. "Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1822, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  26. Tang, Qianfeng, 2015. "Interim partially correlated rationalizability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 36-44.
  27. Bar Light & Ramesh Johari & Gabriel Weintraub, 2019. "Quality Selection in Two-Sided Markets: A Constrained Price Discrimination Approach," Papers 1912.02251, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2023.
  28. Igal Milchtaich, 2014. "Implementability of correlated and communication equilibrium outcomes in incomplete information games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(2), pages 283-350, May.
  29. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013. "Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000725, David K. Levine.
  30. repec:pri:metric:wp023_2011_bergemann_morris.pdf is not listed on IDEAS
  31. Mira Frick & Ryota Iijima & Yuhta Ishii, 2021. "Learning Efficiency of Multi-Agent Information Structures," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2299R2, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jul 2022.
  32. Taneva, Ina A, 2015. "Information Design," 2007 Annual Meeting, July 29-August 1, 2007, Portland, Oregon TN 2015-50, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  33. Ina Taneva, 2019. "Information Design," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 151-185, November.
  34. Kloosterman, Andrew, 2015. "Public information in Markov games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 28-48.
  35. Bernard De Meyer & Ehud Lehrer & Dinah Rosenberg, 2010. "Evaluating Information in Zero-Sum Games with Incomplete Information on Both Sides," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 35(4), pages 851-863, November.
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