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Citations for "Competition and Incentives with Non-Exclusive Contracts"

by Kahn, C.M. & Mookherjee, D.

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  1. Yaron Leitner, 2005. "A theory of an intermediary with nonexclusive contracting," Working Papers 05-12, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  2. Guha, Brishti & Chowdhury, Prabal Roy, 2013. "Micro-finance competition: Motivated micro-lenders, double-dipping and default," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 86-102.
  3. Attar, Andrea & Chassagnon, Arnold, 2009. "On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(9-10), pages 511-525, September.
  4. Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié, 2011. "Nonexclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 79(6), pages 1869-1918, November.
  5. Mariano Tommasi & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2007. "Principal-Agent Contracts under the Threat of Insurance," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 163(3), pages 379-393, September.
  6. Graham Mallard, 2014. "Static Common Agency And Political Influence: An Evaluative Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 17-35, 02.
  7. Attar Andrea & Campioni Eloisa & Piaser Gwenael, 2006. "Multiple Lending and Constrained Efficiency in the Credit Market," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-35, October.
  8. OZERTURK, Saltuk, 2006. "Hedge markets for executives and corporate agency," CORE Discussion Papers 2006009, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  9. Boone, Jan, 2015. "Basic versus supplementary health insurance: Moral hazard and adverse selection," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 50-58.
  10. Alberto Bennardo & Marco Pagano & Salvatore Piccolo, 2015. "Multiple Bank Lending, Creditor Rights, and Information Sharing," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 19(2), pages 519-570.
  11. Alberto Bisin & Danilo Guaitoli, 2004. "Moral Hazard and Nonexclusive Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(2), pages 306-328, Summer.
  12. Castiglionesi, Fabio & Wagner, Wolf, 2013. "On the efficiency of bilateral interbank insurance," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 177-200.
  13. Hans Degryse & Vasso Ioannidou & Erik von Schedvin, 2016. "On the Nonexclusivity of Loan Contracts: An Empirical Investigation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(12), pages 3510-3533, December.
  14. Frédéric Loss & Gwanaël Piaser, 2013. "Linear Prices Equilibria and Nonexclusive Insurance Market," Working Papers hal-00870113, HAL.
  15. Reich, S., 2007. "Robust Incentives," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0729, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  16. Alberto Bisin & Piero Gottardi & Adriano A. Rampini, 2008. "Managerial Hedging and Portfolio Monitoring," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(1), pages 158-209, 03.
  17. Yaron Leitner, 2009. "Inducing agents to report hidden trades: a theory of an intermediary," Working Papers 09-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  18. Simpson Prescott, Edward & Weinberg, John A., 2003. "Incentives, communication, and payment instruments," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 433-454, March.
  19. repec:got:cegedp:78 is not listed on IDEAS
  20. Annamaria Menichini, 2000. "Third parties as an incentive to comply," CSEF Working Papers 41, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 01 Jan 2006.
  21. Yaron Leitner, 2003. "Non-exclusive contracts, collateralized trade, and a theory of an exchange," Working Papers 03-3, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  22. A. Citanna & P. Siconolfi, 2016. "Designing insurance markets with moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 62(1), pages 325-360, June.
  23. Alberto Bisin & Piero Gottardi, 2003. "Competitive Markets for Non-Exclusive Contracts with Adverse Selection: the Role of Entry Fees," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 6(2), pages 313-338, April.
  24. Dam, Kaniska, 2015. "Job assignment, market power and managerial incentives," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 222-233.
  25. Blonski, Matthias & von Lilienfeld-Toal, Ulf, 2008. "Excess returns and the distinguished player paradox," Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers 78, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
  26. Bloise, Gaetano & Reichlin, Pietro, 2005. "Risk and intermediation in a dual financial market economy," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(3), pages 257-279, September.
  27. Darren Filson, 2003. "Dynamic Common Agency, Vertical Integration, and Investment: The Economics of Movie Distribution," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 2003-07, Claremont Colleges.
  28. repec:ipg:wpaper:2014-042 is not listed on IDEAS
  29. repec:dau:papers:123456789/4717 is not listed on IDEAS
  30. Bizer, David S. & DeMarzo, Peter M., 1999. "Optimal Incentive Contracts When Agents Can Save, Borrow, and Default," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 241-269, October.
  31. Mookherjee, D. & Motta, A., 2016. "A theory of interactions between MFIs and informal lenders," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 191-200.
  32. Bisin, Alberto & Guaitoli, Danilo, 2012. "Information extraction and norms of mutual protection," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 154-162.
  33. McIntosh, Craig & Wydick, Bruce, 2005. "Competition and microfinance," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(2), pages 271-298, December.
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