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Citations for "Optimal contracts with public ex post information"

by Riordan, Michael H. & Sappington, David E. M.

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  1. Roland Strausz, . "Getting to Know your Agent: Interim Information in Long Term Contractual Relationships," Papers 014, Departmental Working Papers.
  2. Marcello D'Amato & Riccardo Martina & Salvatore Piccolo, 2005. "Competitive Pressure, Incentives and Managerial Rewards," CSEF Working Papers 148, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 01 Jul 2006.
  3. Hiriart, Yolande & Martimort, David & Pouyet, Jérôme, 2004. "On the Optimal Use of Ex Ante Regulation and Ex Post Liability," IDEI Working Papers 274, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  4. Boyer, Marcel, 2003. "Competition and the reform of incentive schemes in the regulated sector," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1353-1381, August.
  5. R. Gary-Bobo & Y. Spiegel, 2003. "Optimal state-contingent regulation under limited liability," THEMA Working Papers 2003-09, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  6. repec:dgr:rugsom:12004-eef is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Aubert, Cécile & Pouyet, Jérome, 2006. "Partial Yardstick Regulation and Collusion," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/4072, Paris Dauphine University.
  8. Michela Cella, 2006. "Informed Principal with Correlation," Economics Series Working Papers 261, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  9. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Martimort, David, 1998. "Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation," IDEI Working Papers 81, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  10. Bose, Subir & Zhao, Jinhua, 2003. "Optimal Use of Correlated Information in Mechanism Design When Full Surplus Extraction May Be Impossible," Staff General Research Papers 10579, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  11. Geoffroy de Clippel & David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2010. "Egalitarian Equivalence under Asymmetric Information," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 813.10, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  12. Marco Pagnozzi & Salvatore Piccolo, 2012. "Information Sharing between Vertical Hierarchies," CSEF Working Papers 322, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  13. Finkle, Aaron & Shin, Dongsoo, 2007. "Conducting inaccurate audits to commit to the audit policy," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 379-389, April.
  14. Hoppe, Eva I & Schmitz, Patrick W, 2013. "Do Sellers Offer Menus of Contracts to Separate Buyer Types? An Experimental Test of Adverse Selection Theory," CEPR Discussion Papers 9510, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  15. Nien-Pen Liu & Dachrahn Wu, 2007. "Does a Non-verifiable Imperfect Informative Binary Signal Always a Strictly Positive Value?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 10(7), pages 1-7.
  16. Kessler, Anke & Lülfesmann, Christoph & Schmitz, Patrick W, 2002. "Optimal Contracting in Agency with Verifiable Ex Post Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 3428, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  17. Roland Strausz, 2006. "Interim Information in Long-Term Contracts," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(4), pages 1041-1067, December.
  18. Drugov, Mikhail, 2014. "Bargaining with Informational Externalities in a Market Equilibrium," CEPR Discussion Papers 10021, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  19. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:10:y:2007:i:7:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
  20. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Optimal selling strategies when buyers may have hard information," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(4), pages 859-870, May.
  21. Chifeng Dai, 2010. "Imperfect verification, appeals, and limited liability," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 23-41, February.
  22. Mikhail Drugov, 2010. "Information and delay in an agency model," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(3), pages 598-615.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.