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Citations for "Optimal contracts with public ex post information"

by Riordan, Michael H. & Sappington, David E. M.

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  1. Marco Pagnozzi & Salvatore Piccolo, 2012. "Information Sharing between Vertical Hierarchies," CSEF Working Papers 322, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  2. Hiriart, Yolande & Martimort, David & Pouyet, Jerome, 2004. "On the optimal use of ex ante regulation and ex post liability," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 231-235, August.
  3. Geoffroy de Clippel & David Perez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2010. "Egalitarian Equivalence under Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 2010-5, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  4. Roland Strausz, . "Getting to Know your Agent: Interim Information in Long Term Contractual Relationships," Papers 014, Departmental Working Papers.
  5. Marcello D'Amato & Riccardo Martina & Salvatore Piccolo, 2005. "Competitive Pressure, Incentives and Managerial Rewards," CSEF Working Papers 148, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 01 Jul 2006.
  6. Kessler, Anke & Lülfesmann, Christoph & Schmitz, Patrick W, 2002. "Optimal Contracting in Agency with Verifiable Ex Post Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 3428, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. R. Gary-Bobo & Y. Spiegel, 2003. "Optimal state-contingent regulation under limited liability," THEMA Working Papers 2003-09, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  8. Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2015. "Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 17-33.
  9. Bose, Subir & Zhao, Jinhua, 2007. "Optimal use of correlated information in mechanism design when full surplus extraction may be impossible," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 357-381, July.
  10. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:10:y:2007:i:7:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
  11. Michela Cella, 2006. "Informed Principal with Correlation," Economics Series Working Papers 261, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  12. Gomes, Renato & Gottlieb, Daniel & Maestri, Lucas, 2016. "Experimentation and project selection: Screening and learning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 145-169.
  13. Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 2000. "Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(2), pages 309-342, March.
  14. repec:dau:papers:123456789/4072 is not listed on IDEAS
  15. Nien-Pen Liu & Dachrahn Wu, 2007. "Does a Non-verifiable Imperfect Informative Binary Signal Always a Strictly Positive Value?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 10(7), pages 1-7.
  16. Mikhail Drugov, 2006. "Information and Delay in an Agency Model," Economics Series Working Papers 298, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  17. Boyer, Marcel, 2003. "Competition and the reform of incentive schemes in the regulated sector," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1353-1381, August.
  18. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Optimal selling strategies when buyers may have hard information," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(4), pages 859-870, May.
  19. Armstrong, Mark & Sappington, David E.M., 2007. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier.
  20. Roland Strausz, 2006. "Interim Information in Long-Term Contracts," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(4), pages 1041-1067, December.
  21. Finkle, Aaron & Shin, Dongsoo, 2007. "Conducting inaccurate audits to commit to the audit policy," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 379-389, April.
  22. Lionel Thomas & Claude Jessua, 1996. "Incitations et information corrélée : conséquences sur l'organisation des marchés publics," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 47(3), pages 457-466.
  23. Drugov, Mikhail, 2014. "Bargaining with Informational Externalities in a Market Equilibrium," CEPR Discussion Papers 10021, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  24. Chifeng Dai, 2010. "Imperfect verification, appeals, and limited liability," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 23-41, February.
  25. Daniel Danau & Analisa Vinella, 2016. "On the optimal use of correlated information in contractual design under limited liability," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 2016-05, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
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