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Eliciting information from multiple experts

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Pablo Amorós, 2013. "Picking the winners," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(4), pages 845-865, November.
  2. Irene Valsecchi, 2013. "The expert problem: a survey," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 303-331, November.
  3. Ali, S. Nageeb & Bohren, J. Aislinn, 2019. "Should straw polls be banned?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 284-294.
  4. Zapechelnyuk, Andriy, 2013. "Eliciting information from a committee," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 2049-2067.
  5. Alp Atakan & Mehmet Ekmekci & Ludovic Renou, 2021. "Cross-verification and Persuasive Cheap Talk," Papers 2102.13562, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2021.
  6. Pablo Amorós, 2020. "Aggregating experts’ opinions to select the winner of a competition," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(3), pages 833-849, September.
  7. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey, 2008. "The informational effects of competition and collusion in legislative politics," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(7), pages 1541-1563, July.
  8. Ronny Razin & Gilat Levy, 2004. "Multidimentional Cheap Talk," 2004 Meeting Papers 184, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  9. Gordon Rausser & Leo Simon & Jinhua Zhao, 2015. "Rational exaggeration and counter-exaggeration in information aggregation games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 59(1), pages 109-146, May.
  10. Amorós, Pablo, 2023. "Evaluation and strategic manipulation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
  11. Mark Thordal-Le Quement, 2016. "The (Human) Sampler's Curses," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(4), pages 115-148, November.
  12. Kawamura, Kohei, 2008. "Communication for Public Goods," SIRE Discussion Papers 2008-25, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
  13. Kohei Kawamura, 2008. "Communication for Public Goods," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 182, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  14. Gerardi, Dino & McLean, Richard & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2009. "Aggregation of expert opinions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 339-371, March.
  15. Amorós, Pablo, 2009. "Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1211-1226, May.
  16. Rossella Argenziano & Sergei Severinov & Francesco Squintani, 2016. "Strategic Information Acquisition and Transmission," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 119-155, August.
  17. Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2010. "Decision Rules for Experts with Opposing Interests," Working Papers 674, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
  18. Thomas Lanzi & Jerome Mathis, 2008. "Consulting an Expert with Potentially Conflicting Preferences," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 65(3), pages 185-204, November.
  19. Deimen, Inga & Ketelaar, Felix & Le Quement, Mark T., 2015. "Consistency and communication in committees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 24-35.
  20. Rantakari, Heikki, 2014. "A simple model of project selection with strategic communication and uncertain motives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 14-42.
  21. Ayça Özdoðan, 2016. "A Survey of Strategic Communication and Persuasion," Bogazici Journal, Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies, Bogazici University, Department of Economics, vol. 30(1), pages 1-21.
  22. Flavia Roldán, 2013. "The organization of expertise in the presence of communication," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 17(1), pages 63-81, March.
  23. Galeotti, Andrea & Ghiglino, Christian & Squintani, Francesco, 2009. "Strategic Information Transmission in Networks," Economics Discussion Papers 2974, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
  24. Paolo Balduzzi & Clara Graziano & Annalisa Luporini, 2014. "Voting in small committees," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 111(1), pages 69-95, February.
  25. Mylovanov, Tymofiy & Zapechelnyuk, Andriy, 2013. "Decision rules revealing commonly known events," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(1), pages 8-10.
  26. Alexander E. Saak & David A. Hennessy, 2018. "A model of reporting and controlling outbreaks by public health agencies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 66(1), pages 21-64, July.
  27. Ambrus, Attila & Lu, Shih En, 2014. "Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 174-189.
  28. Yuk-fai Fong & Peter Eso, 2008. "Wait and See," 2008 Meeting Papers 303, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  29. Elisabeth Schulte, 2012. "Communication in committees: who should listen?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 97-117, January.
  30. Minozzi, William & Woon, Jonathan, 2019. "The limited value of a second opinion: Competition and exaggeration in experimental cheap talk games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 144-162.
  31. Fahad Khalil & Doyoung Kim & Dongsoo Shin, 2006. "Optimal Task Design: To Integrate or Separate Planning and Implementation?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(2), pages 457-478, June.
  32. Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2010. "Decision Rules for Experts with Opposing Interests," Working Papers 674, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
  33. Mark Quement & Venuga Yokeeswaran, 2015. "Subgroup deliberation and voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(1), pages 155-186, June.
  34. Migrow, Dimitri, 2021. "Designing communication hierarchies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
  35. Dezsö Szalay & Ramon Arean, 2005. "Communicating with a Team of Experts," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 05.12, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
  36. Li, Zhuozheng & Rantakari, Heikki & Yang, Huanxing, 2016. "Competitive cheap talk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 65-89.
  37. Kohei Kawamura, 2007. "Constrained Communication with Multiple Agents: Anonymity, Equal Treatment, and Public Good Provision," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 166, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  38. Galeotti, Andrea & Ghiglino, Christian & Squintani, Francesco, 2013. "Strategic information transmission networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 1751-1769.
  39. Bayar, Onur & Chemmanur, Thomas J., 2021. "A model of the editorial process in academic journals," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 50(9).
  40. Foerster, Manuel, 2019. "Dynamics of strategic information transmission in social networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(1), January.
  41. Kohei Kawamura, 2006. "Anonymity, Equal Treatment, and Overconfidence: Constraints on Communication May Enhance Information Transmission," Economics Series Working Papers 268, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  42. Chiba, Saori & Hori, Kazumi, 2022. "Two-sided strategic information transmission," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 229-241.
  43. Ebrahimnejad, Ali & Tavana, Madjid & Santos-Arteaga, Francisco J., 2016. "An integrated data envelopment analysis and simulation method for group consensus ranking," Mathematics and Computers in Simulation (MATCOM), Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 1-17.
  44. Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2013. "Optimal Arbitration," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 54(3), pages 769-785, August.
  45. Chen, Ying & Oliver, Atara, 2023. "When to ask for an update: Timing in strategic communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
  46. Szalay, Dezső & Deimen, Inga, 2020. "Authority in a theory of the firm," CEPR Discussion Papers 15026, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  47. Feddersen, Timothy & Gradwohl, Ronen, 2020. "Decentralized advice," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
  48. De Moragas, Antoni-Italo, 2020. "When consensus hurts: experts' advice and electoral support," MPRA Paper 114800, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  49. Hongbin Cai, 2009. "Costly participation and heterogeneous preferences in informational committees," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(1), pages 173-189, March.
  50. Kawamura, Kohei, 2013. "Eliciting information from a large population," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 44-54.
  51. Pablo Amorós, 2017. "The problem of aggregating experts' opinions to select the winner of a competition," Working Papers 2017-04, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
  52. Grillo, Edoardo, 2016. "The hidden cost of raising voters’ expectations: Reference dependence and politicians’ credibility," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 126-143.
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