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Citations for "Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements"

by Blume, Lawrence & Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie

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  1. William Thomson, 2006. "A Characterization of a Family of Rules for the Adjudication of Conflicting Claims," RCER Working Papers 530, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  2. Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2001. "Subjective Uncertainty Over Behavior Strategies: A Correction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7571, David K. Levine.
  3. Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry & Swinkels, Jeroen M., 1997. "How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 193-218, February.
  4. Perea Andrés, 2003. "Proper Rationalizability and Belief Revision in Dynamic Games," Research Memorandum 048, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  5. Asheim, Geir B. & Perea, Andres, 2005. "Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 15-42, October.
  6. John Hillas & Elon Kohlberg, 1996. "Foundations of Strategic Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information 9606002, EconWPA, revised 18 Sep 1996.
  7. Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2005. "Refinements of Nash Equilibrium," Research Papers 1897, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  8. Blume, Lawrence E & Zame, William R, 1994. "The Algebraic Geometry of Perfect and Sequential Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 783-94, July.
  9. Kin Chung Lo, 1995. "Nash Equilibrium without Mutual Knowledge of Rationality," Working Papers ecpap-95-04, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  10. Streufert, Peter A., 2015. "An elementary proof that additive i-likelihood characterizes the supports of consistent assessments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 37-46.
  11. Wilson, Robert B. & Govindan, Srihari, 2007. "On Forward Induction," Research Papers 1955, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  12. Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2006. "Sufficient Conditions for Stable Equilibria," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000267, UCLA Department of Economics.
  13. Elyès Jouini & Hédi Kallal, 1999. "Efficient Trading Strategies in the Presence of Market Frictions," New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires 99-035, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-.
  14. Shurojit Chatterji & Srihari Govindan, 2002. "Message Spaces for Perfect Correlated Equilibria," Working Papers 0207, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
  15. Pivato, Marcus, 2011. "Additive representation of separable preferences over infinite products," MPRA Paper 28262, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  16. Asheim, Geir B. & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2000. "Amissibility and Common Belief," Research Papers in Economics 2000:6, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
  17. Perea, Andres, 2007. "Proper belief revision and equilibrium in dynamic games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 572-586, September.
  18. Peter J. Hammond, 1997. "Non-Archimedean Subjective Probabilities in Decision Theory and Games," Working Papers 97038, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
  19. Perea, Andrés, 2011. "An algorithm for proper rationalizability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 510-525, June.
  20. Perea Andrés, 2003. "Rationalizability and Minimal Complexity in Dynamic Games," Research Memorandum 047, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  21. Asheim, Geir B., 2002. "On the epistemic foundation for backward induction," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 121-144, November.
  22. Penta, Antonio, 2004. "Perfect Sequential Reciprocity and Dynamic Consistency," MPRA Paper 10261, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Sep 2007.
  23. Yang, Chih-Chun, 2015. "Weak assumption and iterative admissibility," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 87-101.
  24. Eichberger, Jurgen & Kelsey, David, 2000. "Non-Additive Beliefs and Strategic Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 183-215, February.
  25. Keisler, H. Jerome & Lee, Byung Soo, 2011. "Common assumption of rationality," MPRA Paper 34441, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  26. Asheim,G.B., 1999. "Proper consistency," Memorandum 31/1999, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  27. Matthew Ryan, 2001. "Capacity Updating Rules and Rational Belief Change," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 73-87, August.
  28. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2003:i:20:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
  29. Joseph Halpern, 2009. "A nonstandard characterization of sequential equilibrium, perfect equilibrium, and proper equilibrium," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 37-49, March.
  30. Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2008. "Decision-Theoretic Forward Induction," Research Papers 1986, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  31. Halpern, Joseph Y., 2010. "Lexicographic probability, conditional probability, and nonstandard probability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 155-179, January.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.