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Citations for "Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements"

by Blume, Lawrence & Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie

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  1. Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2006. "On Forward Induction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 321307000000000618, David K. Levine.
  2. Lawrence E. Blume & William R. Zame, 1993. "The Algebraic Geometry of Perfect and Sequential Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information 9309001, EconWPA.
  3. Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2006. "Sufficient Conditions for Stable Equilibria," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000267, UCLA Department of Economics.
  4. Kin Chung Lo, 1995. "Nash Equilibrium without Mutual Knowledge of Rationality," Working Papers ecpap-95-04, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  5. Peter J. Hammond, 1997. "Non-Archimedean Subjective Probabilities in Decision Theory and Games," Working Papers 97038, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
  6. Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2002. "Subjective Uncertainty over Behavior Strategies: A Correction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(2), pages 473-478, June.
  7. Perea, Andrés, 2011. "An algorithm for proper rationalizability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 510-525, June.
  8. Asheim, Geir B., 2002. "On the epistemic foundation for backward induction," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 121-144, November.
  9. Pivato, Marcus, 2011. "Additive representation of separable preferences over infinite products," MPRA Paper 28262, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. Asheim, Geir B. & Perea, Andres, 2005. "Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 15-42, October.
  11. Asheim,G.B., 1999. "Proper consistency," Memorandum 31/1999, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  12. Shurojit Chatterji & Srihari Govindan, 2006. "Message spaces for perfect correlated equilibria," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 475-479, 06.
  13. John Hillas & Elon Kohlberg, 1996. "Foundations of Strategic Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information 9606002, EconWPA, revised 18 Sep 1996.
  14. Perea Andrés, 2003. "Proper Rationalizability and Belief Revision in Dynamic Games," Research Memorandum 048, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  15. Perea Andrés, 2003. "Rationalizability and Minimal Complexity in Dynamic Games," Research Memorandum 047, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  16. Penta, Antonio, 2004. "Perfect Sequential Reciprocity and Dynamic Consistency," MPRA Paper 10261, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Sep 2007.
  17. Elyès Jouini & Hédi Kallal, 1999. "Efficient Trading Strategies in the Presence of Market Frictions," New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires 99-035, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-.
  18. Keisler, H. Jerome & Lee, Byung Soo, 2011. "Common assumption of rationality," MPRA Paper 34441, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  19. Halpern, Joseph Y., 2010. "Lexicographic probability, conditional probability, and nonstandard probability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 155-179, January.
  20. Asheim,G.B. & Dufwenberg,M., 2000. "Admissibility and common belief," Memorandum 07/2000, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  21. George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson & Jeroen M. Swinkels, . "How Proper is Sequential Equilibrium," ELSE working papers 045, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
  22. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2003:i:20:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
  23. Thomson, William, 2013. "A characterization of a family of rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 157-168.
  24. Perea, Andres, 2007. "Proper belief revision and equilibrium in dynamic games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 572-586, September.
  25. Matthew Ryan, 2001. "Capacity Updating Rules and Rational Belief Change," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 73-87, August.
  26. Yang, Chih-Chun, 2015. "Weak assumption and iterative admissibility," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 87-101.
  27. Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2008. "Decision-Theoretic Forward Induction," Research Papers 1986, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  28. Eichberger, Jurgen & Kelsey, David, 2000. "Non-Additive Beliefs and Strategic Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 183-215, February.
  29. Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2005. "Refinements of Nash Equilibrium," Research Papers 1897, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  30. Joseph Halpern, 2009. "A nonstandard characterization of sequential equilibrium, perfect equilibrium, and proper equilibrium," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 37-49, March.
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