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Citations for "Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements"

by Blume, Lawrence & Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie

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  1. Perea Andrés, 2003. "Proper Rationalizability and Belief Revision in Dynamic Games," Research Memorandum 048, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  2. Mailath, G.J. & Samuelson, L., 1996. "How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium?," Working papers 9611, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  3. Eichberger, Jurgen & Kelsey, David, 2000. "Non-Additive Beliefs and Strategic Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 183-215, February.
  4. Thomson, William, 2013. "A characterization of a family of rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 157-168.
  5. Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2005. "Refinements of Nash Equilibrium," Research Papers 1897, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  6. Asheim, Geir B. & Perea, Andres, 2005. "Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 15-42, October.
  7. Levine, David & Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew, 2002. "Subjective Uncertainty Over Behavior Strategies: A Correction," Scholarly Articles 3200611, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  8. Shurojit Chatterji & Srihari Govindan, 2006. "Message spaces for perfect correlated equilibria," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 475-479, 06.
  9. Keisler, H. Jerome & Lee, Byung Soo, 2011. "Common assumption of rationality," MPRA Paper 34441, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. Asheim,G.B., 1999. "On the epistemic foundation for backward induction," Memorandum 30/1999, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  11. Asheim,G.B., 1999. "Proper consistency," Memorandum 31/1999, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  12. Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2008. "On Forward Induction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001859, David K. Levine.
  13. Halpern, Joseph Y., 2010. "Lexicographic probability, conditional probability, and nonstandard probability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 155-179, January.
  14. Blume, Lawrence E & Zame, William R, 1994. "The Algebraic Geometry of Perfect and Sequential Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 783-94, July.
  15. Perea, Andrés, 2011. "An algorithm for proper rationalizability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 510-525, June.
  16. Hammond, Peter J., 1999. "Non-Archimedean subjective probabilities in decision theory and games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 139-156, September.
  17. Asheim, Geir B. & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2000. "Amissibility and Common Belief," Research Papers in Economics 2000:6, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
  18. Kin Chung Lo, 1995. "Nash Equilibrium without Mutual Knowledge of Rationality," Working Papers ecpap-95-04, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  19. Joseph Halpern, 2009. "A nonstandard characterization of sequential equilibrium, perfect equilibrium, and proper equilibrium," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 37-49, March.
  20. Pivato, Marcus, 2011. "Additive representation of separable preferences over infinite products," MPRA Paper 28262, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  21. Wilson, Robert B. & Govindan, Srihari, 2006. "Sufficient conditions for stable equilibria," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(2), pages 167-206, June.
  22. Penta, Antonio, 2004. "Perfect Sequential Reciprocity and Dynamic Consistency," MPRA Paper 10261, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Sep 2007.
  23. Elyès Jouini & Hédi Kallal, 1999. "Efficient Trading Strategies in the Presence of Market Frictions," New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires 99-035, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-.
  24. Matthew Ryan, 2001. "Capacity Updating Rules and Rational Belief Change," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 73-87, August.
  25. Perea Andrés, 2003. "Rationalizability and Minimal Complexity in Dynamic Games," Research Memorandum 047, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  26. Perea, Andres, 2007. "Proper belief revision and equilibrium in dynamic games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 572-586, September.
  27. John Hillas & Elon Kohlberg, 1996. "Foundations of Strategic Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information 9606002, EconWPA, revised 18 Sep 1996.
  28. Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2008. "Decision-Theoretic Forward Induction," Research Papers 1986, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  29. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2003:i:20:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
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