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An Axiomatic Characterization of Common Knowledge

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. John Geanakoplos, 1993. "Common Knowledge," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1062, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  2. Badics, Judit & Gömöri, András, 2004. "Információ és tudás
    [Information and knowledge]
    ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(2), pages 127-138.
  3. Larry Samuelson & Andrew Postlewaite & George Mailath, 2007. "Pricing in Matching Markets," 2007 Meeting Papers 531, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  4. Bonanno, G. & Nehring, K., 1995. "Intersubjective Consistency of Beliefs and the Logic of Common Belief," Department of Economics 95-08, California Davis - Department of Economics.
  5. Fukuda, Satoshi, 2019. "Epistemic foundations for set-algebraic representations of knowledge," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 73-82.
  6. Lismont L. & Mongin, P., 1996. "Belief closure: A semantics of common knowledge for modal propositional logic," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 60-60, February.
  7. Guilhem Lecouteux, 2017. "Bayesian Game Theorists and Non-Bayesian Players," GREDEG Working Papers 2017-30, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France, revised Jul 2018.
  8. Garcia, René, 1986. "La théorie économique de l’information : exposé synthétique de la littérature," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 62(1), pages 88-109, mars.
  9. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 280-312, August.
  10. Bruce D. Smith, 1982. "Money as a medium of transaction in the overlapping generations model," Working Papers 216, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, revised 1982.
  11. Masahiko Aoki, 2013. "Institutions as cognitive media between strategic interactions and individual beliefs," Chapters, in: Comparative Institutional Analysis, chapter 17, pages 298-312, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  12. Shyam NMI Sunder, 2001. "Knowing What Others Know: Common Knowledge, Accounting, and Capital Markets," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm213, Yale School of Management.
  13. repec:dau:papers:123456789/8575 is not listed on IDEAS
  14. Farokhi, Farhad & Johansson, Karl H., 2015. "A piecewise-constant congestion taxing policy for repeated routing games," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 123-143.
  15. Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring, "undated". "Agreeing To Disagree: A Survey," Department of Economics 97-18, California Davis - Department of Economics.
  16. Neukirchen, Thomas & Klumpp, Matthias, 2019. "Digital logistics, strategic cognitive readiness and employee training," Chapters from the Proceedings of the Hamburg International Conference of Logistics (HICL), in: Kersten, Wolfgang & Blecker, Thorsten & Ringle, Christian M. (ed.),Artificial Intelligence and Digital Transformation in Supply Chain Management: Innovative Approaches for Supply Chains. Proceedings of the Hamburg Int, volume 27, pages 117-150, Hamburg University of Technology (TUHH), Institute of Business Logistics and General Management.
  17. Dahai Yu, 1998. "Rational bubbles under diverse information," International Finance Discussion Papers 621, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), revised 1998.
  18. Bonanno, Giacomo & Nehring, Klaus, 1998. "On the logic and role of Negative Introspection of Common Belief," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 17-36, January.
  19. Jean-Pierre Dupuy, 1989. "Convention et Common knowledge," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 40(2), pages 361-400.
  20. Tsakas, Elias, 2007. "Aggregate information, common knowledge, and agreeing not to bet," Working Papers in Economics 254, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
  21. Zimper, Alexander, 2009. "Half empty, half full and why we can agree to disagree forever," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 283-299, August.
  22. Cyril Hédoin, 2016. "Community-Based Reasoning in Games: Salience, Rule-Following, and Counterfactuals," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 7(4), pages 1-17, November.
  23. Satoshi Fukuda, 2018. "Representing Unawareness on State Spaces," Working Papers 635, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  24. Dominiak, Adam & Lefort, Jean-Philippe, 2015. "“Agreeing to disagree” type results under ambiguity," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 119-129.
  25. Tsakas, Elias & Voorneveld, Mark, 2007. "Efficient communication, common knowledge, and consensus," Working Papers in Economics 255, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
  26. Bernard Walliser, 1991. "Logique épistémique et théorie des jeux," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 42(5), pages 801-832.
  27. Aoki, Masahiko, 2010. "Understanding Douglass North in game-theoretic language," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 139-146, May.
  28. Binmore, Ken, 2015. "Rationality," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
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