Understanding Douglass North in game-theoretic language
By using game-theoretic language, this paper attempts to interpret the North's recent framework for institutional studies. Particularly relying on a foundational study of knowledge and culture in epistemic game theory, it clarifies three subtly different meanings of the beliefs used by North - behavioral, cultural, and elites' subjective - in the evolutions of institutions. It also suggests the ways to respond to the North's call for interdisciplinary approach by applying analytical tools of strategic complementarities and linked games.
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