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Citations for "p-dominance and Belief Potential"

by S. Morris & R. Rob & H. Shin

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  1. Phillip Johnson & David K Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1998. "Evolution and Information in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2138, David K. Levine.
  2. Hyun Shin, 2001. "Coordination Risk and the Price of Debt," Economics Series Working Papers 1999-W25, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  3. Stephen Morris, . "Interaction Games: A Unified Analysis of Incomplete Information, Local Interaction and Random Matching," Penn CARESS Working Papers 1879bf5487d743edef7f32bb2, Penn Economics Department.
  4. Amil Dasgupta & Jakub Steiner & Colin Stewart, 2007. "Efficient Dynamic Coordination with Individual Learning," FMG Discussion Papers dp600, Financial Markets Group.
  5. David M. Frankel & Stephen Morris & Ady Pauzner, 2001. "Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1336, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  6. Christina Bannier, 2003. "The Role of Information Disparity in the 1994/95 Mexican Peso," International Finance 0310001, EconWPA.
  7. Agastya, Murali, 2003. "Stochastic Stability In A Double Auction," Working Papers 5, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
  8. Oyama, Daisuke & Tercieux, Olivier, 2009. "Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1726-1769, July.
  9. Andrea Gallice, 2012. "Preempting versus Postponing: the Stealing Game," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 281, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
  10. Morris, Stephen, 2000. "Contagion," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(1), pages 57-78, January.
  11. Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 1997. "The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(6), pages 1283-1310, November.
  12. Oyama, Daisuke & Tercieux, Olivier, 2010. "Robust equilibria under non-common priors," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 752-784, March.
  13. Toshimasa Maruta, 1995. "On the Relationship Between Risk-Dominance and Stochastic Stability," Discussion Papers 1122, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  14. Stephen Morris, . "Co-operation and Timing," Penn CARESS Working Papers b8d506ba7aa15345b602bb4eb, Penn Economics Department.
  15. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, . ""Approximate Common Knowledge and Co-ordination: Recent Lessons from Game Theory''," CARESS Working Papres 96-07, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
  16. Stegeman, Mark & Rhode, Paul, 2004. "Stochastic Darwinian equilibria in small and large populations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 171-214, October.
  17. József Sákovics, 2001. "Games of Incomplete Information Without Common Knowledge Priors," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 50(4), pages 347-366, June.
  18. Ross Cressman, 2009. "Continuously stable strategies, neighborhood superiority and two-player games with continuous strategy space," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 221-247, June.
  19. Daijiro Okada & Olivier Tercieux, 2008. "Log-linear Dynamics and Local Potential," Departmental Working Papers 200807, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
  20. Agastya, Murali, 2004. "Stochastic stability in a double auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 203-222, August.
  21. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2000. "Global Games: Theory and Applications," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1275, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  22. Philip Johnson & David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2000. "Evolution and Information in a Gift Giving Game," Levine's Working Paper Archive 162, David K. Levine.
  23. M. Sbracia & Alessandro Prati, 2002. "Currency Crises and Uncertainty About Fundamentals," IMF Working Papers 02/3, International Monetary Fund.
  24. Fabrizio Germano, 2003. "On some geometry and equivalence classes of normal form games," Economics Working Papers 669, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  25. David K Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2000. "Evolution Through Imitation in a Single Population," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2122, David K. Levine.
  26. Huberto M. Ennis, 2003. "Economic fundamentals and bank runs," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Spr, pages 55-71.
  27. Rosemarie Nagel & Antonio Cabrales & Roc Armenter, 2002. "Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: An experimental study," Economics Working Papers 601, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  28. Huberto M. Ennis & Todd Keister, 2003. "Aggregate demand management with multiple equilibria," Working Paper 03-04, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  29. V. Bhaskar & Eric van Damme, 1998. "Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring," Game Theory and Information 9809004, EconWPA.
  30. Matsui, Akihiko & Oyama, Daisuke, 2006. "Rationalizable foresight dynamics," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 299-322, August.
  31. Morris, S. & Shin, H.S., 1998. "A Theory of the Onset of Currency Attacks," Economics Papers 149, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
  32. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 1999. "Financial Contagion," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2092, David K. Levine.
  33. Phil Johnson, 1999. "Evolution and Information in a Gift Giving Game," Theory workshop papers 168, UCLA Department of Economics.
  34. Sandholm,W.H., 1999. "Almost global convergence to p-dominant equilibrium," Working papers 37, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  35. Xiudeng Zheng & Ross Cressman & Yi Tao, 2011. "The Diffusion Approximation of Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics: Mean Effective Fixation Time and the Significance of the One-Third Law," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 462-477, September.
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