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Citations for " Limitation of Liability and the Ownership Structure of the Firm"

by Winton, Andrew

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  1. Edward J. Kane & Berry Wilson, 1997. "The demise of double liability as an optimal contract for large-bank stockholders," Proceedings 556, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  2. Saunders, Anthony & Wilson, Berry, 1995. "Contingent liability in banking : useful policy for developing countries?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1538, The World Bank.
  3. Luc Laeven & Ross Levine, 2008. "Complex Ownership Structures and Corporate Valuations," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 21(2), pages 579-604, April.
  4. Armando Gomes, . "Multiple Large Shareholders in Corporate Governance," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 05-99, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
  5. Carletti, Elena & Cerasi, Vittoria & Daltung, Sonja, 2004. "Multiple-bank lending: diversification and free-riding in monitoring," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 04-15, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
  6. Bloch, Francis & Hege, Ulrich, 2003. "Multiple Shareholders and Control Contests," MPRA Paper 42286, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Alex Edmans, 2013. "Blockholders and Corporate Governance," NBER Working Papers 19573, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Howard Bodenhorn, 2015. "Double Liability at Early American Banks," NBER Working Papers 21494, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Paolo Maggioni, 2011. "The introduction of limited liability in nineteenth century England," Openloc Working Papers 1116, Public policies and local development.
  10. Maury, Benjamin & Pajuste, Anete, 2005. "Multiple large shareholders and firm value," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(7), pages 1813-1834, July.
  11. Edmans, Alex & Holderness, Clifford, 2016. "Blockholders: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 11442, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  12. Attig, Najah & Guedhami, Omrane & Mishra, Dev, 2008. "Multiple large shareholders, control contests, and implied cost of equity," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 14(5), pages 721-737, December.
  13. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Love, Inessa & Maksimovic, Vojislav, 2006. "Business environment and the incorporation decision," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(11), pages 2967-2993, November.
  14. Paligorova, Teodora & Xu, Zhaoxia, 2012. "Complex ownership and capital structure," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 701-716.
  15. Thomas H. Noe & Stephen D. Smith, 1997. "The buck stops where? The role of limited liability in economics," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, issue Q 1, pages 46-56.
  16. Boubaker, Sabri & Nguyen, Pascal & Rouatbi, Wael, 2012. "Large shareholders and firm risk-taking behavior," MPRA Paper 39005, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  17. Mário Santos & António Moreira & Elisabete Vieira, 2014. "Ownership concentration, contestability, family firms, and capital structure," Journal of Management and Governance, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 1063-1107, November.
  18. Sami, Hind, 2009. "Random monitoring in financing relationships," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 239-252, May.
  19. Brav, Alon & Dasgupta, Amil & Mathews, Richmond, 2016. "Wolf Pack Activism," CEPR Discussion Papers 11507, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  20. Charles Hickson & John Turner, 2002. "The trading of unlimited liability bank shares: the Bagehot Hypothesis," ESRC Centre for Business Research - Working Papers wp241, ESRC Centre for Business Research.
  21. Del Giudice Alfonso & Marinelli Nicoletta & Vitali Stefania, 2014. "Sovereign Wealth Funds and Target Firms: Does 'Networking' Matter?," Journal of Financial Management, Markets and Institutions, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 2, pages 185-206, December.
  22. Mitchell Berlin & Loretta J. Mester, 2000. "Optimal Financial Contracts for Large Investors: The Role of Lender Liability," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 99-33, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
  23. Carletti, Elena, 2004. "The structure of bank relationships, endogenous monitoring, and loan rates," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 58-86, January.
  24. Isakov, Dusan & Weisskopf, Jean-Philippe, 2013. "Do not wake sleeping dogs: Pay-out policies in founding family firms," FSES Working Papers 443, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, University of Freiburg/Fribourg Switzerland.
  25. Alex Edmans & Gustavo Manso, 2011. "Governance Through Trading and Intervention: A Theory of Multiple Blockholders," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(7), pages 2395-2428.
  26. repec:dau:papers:123456789/5922 is not listed on IDEAS
  27. Acheson, Graeme G. & Turner, John D., 2008. "The death blow to unlimited liability in Victorian Britain: The City of Glasgow failure," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 235-253, July.
  28. Cole, Rebel, 2011. "How do firms choose legal form of organization?," MPRA Paper 32591, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  29. Berlin, Mitchell & Mester, Loretta J., 2001. "Lender Liability and Large Investors," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 108-137, April.
  30. Esty, Benjamin C., 1998. "The impact of contingent liability on commercial bank risk taking," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 189-218, February.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.