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Citations for "Differential Payments within a Bidder Coalition and the Shapley Value"

by Graham, Daniel A & Marshall, Robert C & Richard, Jean-Francois

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  1. Fragnelli, Vito & Gagliardo, Stefano, 2012. "Cooperative models for allocating an object," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 227-229.
  2. Jin, Mingzhou & Wu, S. David, 2006. "Supplier coalitions in on-line reverse auctions: Validity requirements and profit distribution scheme," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 183-194, April.
  3. Françoise Forges & Ram Orzach, 2010. "Core-stable Rings in Second Price Auctions with Common Values," Working Papers 2010.119, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  4. Michel Grabisch, 2013. "The core of games on ordered structures and graphs," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" hal-00803233, HAL.
  5. Katerina Sherstyuk, 1999. "Collusion Without Conspiracy: An Experimental Study of One-Sided Auctions," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 59-75, August.
  6. René Brink & Gerard Laan & Valeri Vasil’ev, 2014. "Constrained core solutions for totally positive games with ordered players," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(2), pages 351-368, May.
  7. Rene van den Brink & Chris Dietz, 2012. "Games with a Local Permission Structure: Separation of Authority and Value Generation," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-126/II, Tinbergen Institute.
  8. Leslie M. Marx & Robert C. Marshall, 2004. "Bidder Collusion," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 108, Econometric Society.
  9. Che, Yeon-Koo & Kim, Jinwoo, 2009. "Optimal collusion-proof auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 565-603, March.
  10. van den Brink, R. & van der Laan, G. & Herings, P.J.J. & Talman, A.J.J., 2015. "The Average Tree permission value for games with a permission tree," Other publications TiSEM 97042492-4b03-4e72-b88d-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  11. Guth, Werner & Peleg, Bezalel, 1996. "On ring formation in auctions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 1-37, August.
  12. René van den Brink, 2006. "On Hierarchies and Communication," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-056/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  13. John Asker, 2010. "A Study of the Internal Organization of a Bidding Cartel," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(3), pages 724-62, June.
  14. Rene van den Brink & Chris Dietz, 2012. "Multi-Player Agents in Cooperative TU-Games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-001/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  15. Khoroshilov, Yuri & Dodonova, Anna, 2007. "Takeover auctions with actively participating targets," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 293-311, May.
  16. Florencia Gabrielli, 2014. "Econometrics of First Price Auctions: a Survey of the Theoretical and Applied Literature," Económica, Departamento de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Nacional de La Plata, vol. 60, pages 77-118, January-D.
  17. René Brink & Gerard Laan & Vitaly Pruzhansky, 2011. "Harsanyi power solutions for graph-restricted games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(1), pages 87-110, February.
  18. René Brink & Gerard Laan & Valeri Vasil’ev, 2007. "Component efficient solutions in line-graph games with applications," Economic Theory, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 33(2), pages 349-364, November.
  19. Asker, John, 2010. "Leniency and post-cartel market conduct: Preliminary evidence from parcel tanker shipping," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 407-414, July.
  20. van den Brink, Rene, 2007. "Null or nullifying players: The difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 767-775, September.
  21. Mikel Álvarez-Mozos & René van den Brink & Gerard van der Laan & Oriol Tejada, 2015. "From Hierarchies to Levels: New Solutions for Games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 15-072/II, Tinbergen Institute.
  22. Rene van den Brink & Ilya Katsev & Gerard van der Laan, 2009. "Axiomatizations of Two Types of Shapley Values for Games on Union Closed Systems," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 09-064/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  23. René Brink & Yukihiko Funaki & Yuan Ju, 2013. "Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values," Social Choice and Welfare, The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(3), pages 693-714, March.
  24. René Brink & René Levínský & Miroslav Zelený, 2015. "On proper Shapley values for monotone TU-games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(2), pages 449-471, May.
  25. René Brink & Arantza Estévez-Fernández & Gerard Laan & Nigel Moes, 2014. "Independence of downstream and upstream benefits in river water allocation problems," Social Choice and Welfare, The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(1), pages 173-194, June.
  26. de Clippel, Geoffroy & Bejan, Camelia, 2011. "No profitable decompositions in quasi-linear allocation problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 1995-2012, September.
  27. René Brink & Yukihiko Funaki, 2009. "Axiomatizations of a Class of Equal Surplus Sharing Solutions for TU-Games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 67(3), pages 303-340, September.
  28. Karine Brisset, 2001. "Formation d'une entente dans un appel d'offres au premier prix et risque de détection exogène," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 67(4), pages 405-419.
  29. Sylvain Ferrières, 2016. "Smoothness, nullified equal loss property and equal division values," Working Papers 2016-01, CRESE.
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