Managerial accountability for payroll expense and firm-size wage effects
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More about this item
KeywordsCompression of ratings; managerial incentives; soft budget constraint; firm-size wage effects; principal-agent model;
- J30 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - General
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-11-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2011-11-21 (Business Economics)
- NEP-CTA-2011-11-21 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-LAB-2011-11-21 (Labour Economics)
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