IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/zewdip/283611.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Talking in a language that everyone can understand? Clarity of speeches by the ECB Executive Board

Author

Listed:
  • Glas, Alexander
  • Müller, Lena

Abstract

We use data on speeches held by members of the European Central Bank's (ECB) Executive Board to analyze whether clarity of central bank communication has increased over time. Employing readability measures as proxy variables, we find that clarity of information provision is trending upward since the inception of the ECB. The increase is gradual, rather than being induced by changes in the board composition or major macroeconomic events. Clarity is higher for speeches aimed at general audiences and for speeches by female speakers. We also show that media sentiment about the ECB is negatively related to complexity.

Suggested Citation

  • Glas, Alexander & Müller, Lena, 2023. "Talking in a language that everyone can understand? Clarity of speeches by the ECB Executive Board," ZEW Discussion Papers 23-073, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:283611
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/283611/1/188118076X.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Olivier Coibion & Yuriy Gorodnichenko & Saten Kumar, 2018. "How Do Firms Form Their Expectations? New Survey Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(9), pages 2671-2713, September.
    2. Stephen Hansen & Michael McMahon & Andrea Prat, 2018. "Transparency and Deliberation Within the FOMC: A Computational Linguistics Approach," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 133(2), pages 801-870.
    3. Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob De Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(4), pages 910-945, December.
    4. Christian Conrad & Michael J. Lamla, 2010. "The High‐Frequency Response of the EUR‐USD Exchange Rate to ECB Communication," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(7), pages 1391-1417, October.
    5. Picault, Matthieu & Pinter, Julien & Renault, Thomas, 2022. "Media sentiment on monetary policy: Determinants and relevance for inflation expectations," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 124(C).
    6. Alan S. Blinder, 2008. "Talking about Monetary Policy: The Virtues (and Vices?) of Central Bank Communication," Working Papers 1048, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
    7. Julien Pinter & Evzen Kocenda, 2021. "Media Treatment of Monetary Policy Surprises and Their Impact on Firms' and Consumers' Expectations," Working Papers IES 2021/30, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Sep 2021.
    8. Jansen, David-Jan, 2011. "Mumbling with great incoherence: Was it really so difficult to understand Alan Greenspan?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 113(1), pages 70-72, October.
    9. Hwang, In Do & Lustenberger, Thomas & Rossi, Enzo, 2023. "Central bank communication and public trust: The case of ECB speeches," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 137(C).
    10. Carin van der Cruijsen & David-Jan Jansen & Jakob de Haan, 2015. "How Much Does the Public Know about the ECB’s Monetary Policy? Evidence from a Survey of Dutch Households," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 11(4), pages 169-218, December.
    11. Dräger, Lena & Lamla, Michael J. & Pfajfar, Damjan, 2016. "Are survey expectations theory-consistent? The role of central bank communication and news," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 84-111.
    12. Conrad, Christian & Enders, Zeno & Glas, Alexander, 2022. "The role of information and experience for households’ inflation expectations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 143(C).
    13. Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob De Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(4), pages 910-945, December.
    14. Olivier Coibion & Yuriy Gorodnichenko & Michael Weber, 2022. "Monetary Policy Communications and Their Effects on Household Inflation Expectations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 130(6), pages 1537-1584.
    15. Newey, Whitney & West, Kenneth, 2014. "A simple, positive semi-definite, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix," Applied Econometrics, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), vol. 33(1), pages 125-132.
    16. repec:pri:cepsud:161blinder is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Du, Brian & Fung, Scott & Loveland, Robert, 2018. "The informational role of options markets: Evidence from FOMC announcements," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 237-256.
    18. Bholat, David & Broughton, Nida & Ter Meer, Janna & Walczak, Eryk, 2019. "Enhancing central bank communications using simple and relatable information," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 1-15.
    19. Kryvtsov, Oleksiy & Petersen, Luba, 2021. "Central bank communication that works: Lessons from lab experiments," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 760-780.
    20. Cukierman, Alex & Meltzer, Allan H, 1986. "A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1099-1128, September.
    21. Alan S. Blinder, 2008. "Talking about Monetary Policy: The Virtues (and Vices?) of Central Bank Communication," Working Papers 1048, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
    22. Binder, Carola, 2017. "Fed speak on main street: Central bank communication and household expectations," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 238-251.
    23. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2002. "Social Value of Public Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1521-1534, December.
    24. Tim Loughran & Bill Mcdonald, 2011. "When Is a Liability Not a Liability? Textual Analysis, Dictionaries, and 10‐Ks," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 66(1), pages 35-65, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Müller, Lena Sophia & Glas, Alexander, 2021. "Talking in a language that everyone can understand? Transparency of speeches by the ECB Executive Board," VfS Annual Conference 2021 (Virtual Conference): Climate Economics 242364, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    2. Ehrmann, Michael & Blinder, Alan & De Haan, Jakob & ,, 2022. "Central Bank Communication with the General Public: Promise or False Hope?," CEPR Discussion Papers 17441, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Lamla, Michael J. & Vinogradov, Dmitri V., 2019. "Central bank announcements: Big news for little people?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 21-38.
    4. Ehrmann, Michael & Wabitsch, Alena, 2022. "Central bank communication with non-experts – A road to nowhere?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 69-85.
    5. Lena Dräger, 2023. "Central Bank Communication with the General Public," CESifo Working Paper Series 10713, CESifo.
    6. Perico Ortiz, Daniel, 2023. "Inflation news coverage, expectations and risk premium," FAU Discussion Papers in Economics 05/2023, Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Institute for Economics.
    7. Bernardo Candia & Olivier Coibion & Yuriy Gorodnichenko, 2020. "Communication and the Beliefs of Economic Agents," NBER Working Papers 27800, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Ferrara, Federico Maria & Angino, Siria, 2022. "Does clarity make central banks more engaging? Lessons from ECB communications," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    9. Munday, Tim & Brookes, James, 2021. "Mark my words: the transmission of central bank communication to the general public via the print media," Bank of England working papers 944, Bank of England.
    10. Bernardo Candia & Olivier Coibion & Yuriy Gorodnichenko, 2021. "The Inflation Expectations of U.S. Firms: Evidence from a new survey," NBER Working Papers 28836, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. R. Erasmus & H. Hollander, 2020. "A Forward Guidance Indicator For The South African Reserve Bank: Implementing A Text Analysis Algorithm," Studies in Economics and Econometrics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 44(3), pages 41-72, December.
    12. Han, Xun & Ma, Sichao & Peng, Yuchao & Xie, Xinyan, 2022. "Central bank communication, corporate maturity mismatch and innovation," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
    13. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli & Gaia Rubera, 2021. "Monetary policy and financial markets: evidence from Twitter traffic," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21160, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    14. Beutel, Johannes & Metiu, Norbert & Stockerl, Valentin, 2021. "Toothless tiger with claws? Financial stability communication, expectations, and risk-taking," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 53-69.
    15. Donato Masciandaro & Oana Peia & Davide Romelli, 2022. "Central Bank Communication and Social Media: From Silence to Twitter," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 22187, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    16. Donato Masciandaro & Oana Peia & Davide Romelli, 2024. "Central bank communication and social media: From silence to Twitter," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(2), pages 365-388, April.
    17. Assenmacher, Katrin & Glöckler, Gabriel & Holton, Sarah & Trautmann, Peter & Ioannou, Demosthenes & Mee, Simon & Alonso, Conception & Argiri, Eleni & Arigoni, Filippo & Bakk-Simon, Klára & Bergbauer, , 2021. "Clear, consistent and engaging: ECB monetary policy communication in a changing world," Occasional Paper Series 274, European Central Bank.
    18. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2020_017 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Coibion, Olivier & Gorodnichenko, Yuriy & Kumar, Saten & Pedemonte, Mathieu, 2020. "Inflation expectations as a policy tool?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 124(C).
    20. Francesco D'Acunto & Daniel Hoang & Maritta Paloviita & Michael Weber, 2020. "Effective Policy Communication: Targets versus Instruments," Working Papers 2020-148, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics.
    21. Ehrmann, Michael & Holton, Sarah & Kedan, Danielle & Phelan, Gillian, 2021. "Monetary policy communication: perspectives from former policy makers at the ECB," Working Paper Series 2627, European Central Bank.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Central Bank Communication; Monetary Policy Transparency; Clarity; Readability;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:283611. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/zemande.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.