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Good Firms, Worker Flows and Local Productivity

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  • Serafinelli, Michel

Abstract

A consensus has emerged that agglomeration economies are an important factor explaining why firms cluster next to each other. Yet disagreement remains over the sources of these agglomeration effects, given non-trivial measurement challenges. This paper is the first to present direct evidence showing how localized knowledge spillovers arise from workers changing jobs within the same local labor market. Specifically, I as-sess the extent to which firm-to-firm labor mobility enhances the productivity of firms located near highly productive firms, using a unique dataset combining Social Security earnings records and balance sheet information for Veneto, a region of Italy with many successful industrial clusters. I first identify a set of highly productive firms, then show that hiring workers with experience at these firms significantly increases the productivity of other firms. To address identification threats, primarily due to unobservable firm-level productivity shocks correlated with hiring, I use a novel instrumental vari- able strategy, which exploits downsizing events at highly productive firms, in addition to control function methods in the spirit of the productivity literature. My findings from both approaches imply that worker flows can explain around 10 percent of the productivity gains experienced by other firms when new highly productive firms are added to a local labor market.

Suggested Citation

  • Serafinelli, Michel, 2015. "Good Firms, Worker Flows and Local Productivity," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113063, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc15:113063
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    1. Ernesto Dal Bó & Frederico Finan & Martín A. Rossi, 2013. "Strengthening State Capabilities: The Role of Financial Incentives in the Call to Public Service," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 128(3), pages 1169-1218.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kirker, Michael, 2019. "Learning Through Hiring: Knowledge From New Workers as an Explanation of Endogenous Growth," MPRA Paper 94505, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Ascani, Andrea & Gagliardi, Luisa, 2020. "Asymmetric spillover effects from MNE investment," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 55(6).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • R10 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - General
    • D24 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Production; Cost; Capital; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity; Capacity
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials

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