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Political Economy of Banking Regulation

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Listed:
  • Buck, Florian
  • Schliephake, Eva

Abstract

The paper argues that national regulators can improve the stability of the domestic banking sector via two substitutable policy instruments; minimum capital requirements and effort spend on domestic supervision. Both tools increase the soundness of a national banking system, but they imply different cost burdens between domestic banks and taxpayers. The optimal domestic policy choice is characterised by trading off marginal costs and benefits born by each party. However, the optimal policy choice changes if banks are allowed to be mobile. We show that countries are better off by harmonising capital requirements on an international standard la Basel, since harmonisation counters a regulatory race with other jurisdictions and will increase national utility.

Suggested Citation

  • Buck, Florian & Schliephake, Eva, 2012. "Political Economy of Banking Regulation," VfS Annual Conference 2012 (Goettingen): New Approaches and Challenges for the Labor Market of the 21st Century 62018, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc12:62018
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    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/62018/1/VfS_2012_pid_854.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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