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Ungebremste Staatsverschuldung? Fiskalregeln bleiben unverzichtbar

Author

Listed:
  • König, Jörg
  • Quitzau, Jörn

Abstract

Die Staatsverschuldung steigt weltweit auf neue Höchststände. Nach Jahren niedriger Zinsen geraten die öffentlichen Haushalte vieler Länder unter Druck. Hinzu kommen neue fiskalische Belastungen durch geopolitische Spannungen, höhere Verteidigungsausgaben und den demografischen Wandel. Gleichzeitig gelingt es vielen Staaten selbst außerhalb akuter Krisensituationen nicht, ihre Haushalte nachhaltig zu konsolidieren und glaubwürdige Strategien zum Schuldenabbau vorzulegen. Kritisch wird Verschuldung vor allem dann, wenn Zweifel an der langfristigen Tragfähigkeit der öffentlichen Finanzen bestehen. Überschuldung entsteht dabei meist schleichend als Folge dauerhaft hoher Defizite. Staatsschulden sind jedoch kein Naturereignis, sondern das Ergebnis politischer Anreizstrukturen. Da Finanzmärkte oder Ratingagenturen Regierungen nur begrenzt zu fiskalischer Disziplin zwingen, dienen Fiskalregeln als institutionelle Schutzmechanismen gegen die politische Neigung, aktuelle Ausgaben über neue Schulden zu finanzieren.

Suggested Citation

  • König, Jörg & Quitzau, Jörn, 2026. "Ungebremste Staatsverschuldung? Fiskalregeln bleiben unverzichtbar," Argumente zur Marktwirtschaft und Politik 186, Stiftung Marktwirtschaft / The Market Economy Foundation, Berlin.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:smwarg:341994
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    References listed on IDEAS

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