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Bismarck versus Beveridge: Flat- and earnings-related unemployment insurance in an efficiency wage framework

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  • Goerke, Laszlo

Abstract

A higher unemployment compensation increases the incentive to shirk in efficiency wage models. If there is a stronger dependence of unemployment benefits on current earnings, these incentives will be reduced. An unemployment insurance with earnings-related benefits is thus characterised by higher employment than one with flat-rate benefits. It is investigated under which conditions this advantage persists in the longer term when financial constraints such as an ex-post constant level of benefits, a cash hmit or a balanced budget rule apply, or when firms are constrained to zero profits.

Suggested Citation

  • Goerke, Laszlo, 1998. "Bismarck versus Beveridge: Flat- and earnings-related unemployment insurance in an efficiency wage framework," Discussion Papers, Series I 291, University of Konstanz, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:kondp1:291
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Beissinger, Thomas & Büsse, Oliver, 2002. "The Impact of the Unemployment Benefit System on International Spillover Effects," University of Regensburg Working Papers in Business, Economics and Management Information Systems 376, University of Regensburg, Department of Economics.
    2. Thomas Beissinger & Oliver Büsse, 2001. "Bismarck versus Beveridge: Which Unemployment Compensation System is more Prone to Labor Market Shocks?," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 58(1), pages 78-102, December.
    3. Pia Weiss, 2001. "How to Finance Unemployment Benefits in an Economy with Search Generated Equilibrium Unemployment," Public Economics 0103001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre, 2003. "Social insurance competition between Bismarck and Beveridge," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 181-196, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    balanced budget; cash limit; earnings-related benefits; efficiency wages; flat-rate benefits; long-run; unemployment insurance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
    • J32 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Retirement Plans; Private Pensions
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings

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