Incentivizing efficient utilization without reducing access: The case against cost-sharing in insurance
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsMoral Hazard; Limited Access; Cost-Sharing; Insurance Rebates;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private
- I14 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health and Inequality
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2017-08-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-IAS-2017-08-13 (Insurance Economics)
- NEP-REG-2017-08-13 (Regulation)
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