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Bargaining power in manufacturer-retailer relationships

  • Haucap, Justus
  • Heimeshoff, Ulrich
  • Klein, Gordon J.
  • Rickert, Dennis
  • Wey, Christian

Research on bargaining power in vertical relationships is scarce. It remains particularly unclear which factors drive bargaining power between negotiating parties in a vertical structure. We use a demand model where consumer demand determines the total pie of industry pro ts. Moreover, we apply a bargaining concept on the supply side to analyze how pro t is split between retailers and manufacturers. Estimates show that bargaining power can be explained by several decision variables for retailers and manufacturers. Options for both indicate that any analysis of bargaining power has to consider a dynamic view on the relevant parameters.

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Paper provided by Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) in its series DICE Discussion Papers with number 107.

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Date of creation: 2013
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:dicedp:107
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  1. Zohra Bouamra-Mechemache & Celine Bonnet, 2013. "Organic label and profits sharing in the French fluid milk market," Working Papers 206153, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, France.
  2. Rickert, Dennis & Wey, Christian & Haucap, Justus & Heimeshoff, Ulrich & Klein, Gordon J., 2013. "Inter-Format Competition among Retailers - The Role of Private Label Products in Market Delineation," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79797, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  3. Michaela Draganska & Daniel Klapper & Sofia B. Villas-Boas, 2010. "A Larger Slice or a Larger Pie? An Empirical Investigation of Bargaining Power in the Distribution Channel," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 29(1), pages 57-74, 01-02.
  4. Arne Risa Hole, 2007. "Fitting mixed logit models by using maximum simulated likelihood," Stata Journal, StataCorp LP, vol. 7(3), pages 388-401, September.
  5. K. Sudhir, 2001. "Structural Analysis of Manufacturer Pricing in the Presence of a Strategic Retailer," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 20(3), pages 244-264, October.
  6. Caprice, Stéphane & von Schlippenbach, Vanessa, 2013. "One-stop shopping as a cause of slotting fees: A rent-shifting mechanism," DICE Discussion Papers 97, Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
  7. Inderst, Roman & Wey, Christian, 2007. "Buyer power and supplier incentives," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 647-667, April.
  8. von Schlippenbach, Vanessa & Wey, Christian, 2011. "One-stop shopping behavior, buyer power, and upstream merger incentives," DICE Discussion Papers 27, Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
  9. Céline Bonnet & Vincent Requillart, 2011. "Does the EU sugar policy reform increase added sugar consumption? An empirical evidence on the soft drink market," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(9), pages 1012-1024, 09.
  10. Kenneth Train, 2003. "Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation," Online economics textbooks, SUNY-Oswego, Department of Economics, number emetr2, September.
  11. Stéphane Caprice & Vanessa Schlippenbach, 2013. "One-Stop Shopping as a Cause of Slotting Fees: A Rent-Shifting Mechanism," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(3), pages 468-487, 09.
  12. K. Sudhir & Vrinda Kadiyali & Vithala R. Rao, 2001. "Structural Analysis of Manufacturer Pricing in the Presence of a Strategic Retailer," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm229, Yale School of Management.
  13. Bonnet, Céline & Dubois, Pierre & Villas Boas, Sofia B., 2009. "Empirical Evidence on the Role of Non Linear Wholesale Pricing and Vertical Restraints on Cost Pass-Through," TSE Working Papers 09-067, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  14. Bonnet, Céline & Dubois, Pierre, 2010. "Non Linear Contracting and Endogenous Buyer Power between Manufacturers and Retailers: Empirical Evidence on Food Retailing in France," IDEI Working Papers 638, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  15. Heimeshoff, Ulrich & Klein, Gordon J., 2013. "Bargaining power and local heroes," DICE Discussion Papers 87, Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
  16. Sergio Meza & K. Sudhir, 2010. "Do private labels increase retailer bargaining power?," Quantitative Marketing and Economics, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 333-363, September.
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