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The agency of CoCo: Why do banks issue contingent convertible bonds?


  • Goncharenko, Roman
  • Ongena, Steven
  • Rauf, Asad


Why do banks issue contingent convertible debt? To answer this question we study comprehensive data covering all issues by publicly traded banks in Europe of contingent convertible bonds (CoCos) that count as additional tier 1 capital (AT1). We find that banks with lower asset volatility are more likely to issue AT1 CoCos than their riskier counterparts, but that CDS spreads do not react following issue announcements. Our estimates therefore suggest that agency costs play a crucial role in banks' ability to successfully issue CoCos. The agency costs may be higher for CoCos than for equity explaining why we observe riskier or lowly capitalized banks to issue equity rather than CoCos.

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  • Goncharenko, Roman & Ongena, Steven & Rauf, Asad, 2017. "The agency of CoCo: Why do banks issue contingent convertible bonds?," CFS Working Paper Series 586, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:cfswop:586

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Dwight Jaffee & Alexei Tchistyi & Boris Albul, 2013. "Contingent Convertible Bonds and Capital Structure Decisions," 2013 Meeting Papers 682, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    2. Avdjiev, Stefan & Bogdanova, Bilyana & Bolton, Patrick & Jiang, Wei & Kartasheva, Anastasia, 2017. "CoCo Issuance and Bank Fragility," CEPR Discussion Papers 12418, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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    4. Koziol, Christian & Lawrenz, Jochen, 2012. "Contingent convertibles. Solving or seeding the next banking crisis?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 90-104.
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    7. Chan, Stephanie & Wijnbergen, Sweder, 2017. "CoCo Design, Risk Shifting Incentives and Financial Fragility," ECMI Papers 12166, Centre for European Policy Studies.
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    10. Stephanie Chan & Sweder van Wijnbergen, 2016. "Coco Design, Risk Shifting Incentives and Capital Regulation," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 16-007/VI, Tinbergen Institute, revised 13 Nov 2017.
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    14. McDonald, Robert L., 2013. "Contingent capital with a dual price trigger," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 230-241.
    15. Anat R. Admati & Peter M. DeMarzo & Martin F. Hellwig & Paul Pfleiderer, 2013. "Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity is Not Socially Expensive," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2013_23, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
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    Cited by:

    1. Pierluigi Bologna & Arianna Miglietta & Anatoli Segura, 2018. "Contagion in the CoCos market? A case study of two stress events," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1201, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    2. Hesse, Henning, 2018. "Incentive effects from write-down CoCo bonds: An empirical analysis," SAFE Working Paper Series 212, Research Center SAFE - Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe, Goethe University Frankfurt.

    More about this item


    CoCos; Contingent Convertible Bonds; Bank Capital Structure;

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage

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