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Default risk in an interconnected banking system with endogeneous asset markets

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  • Bluhm, Marcel
  • Krahnen, Jan Pieter

Abstract

This paper analyzes the emergence of systemic risk in a network model of interconnected bank balance sheets. Given a shock to asset values of one or several banks, systemic risk in the form of multiple bank defaults depends on the strength of balance sheets and asset market liquidity. The price of bank assets on the secondary market is endogenous in the model, thereby relating funding liquidity to expected solvency - an important stylized fact of banking crises. Based on the concept of a system value at risk, Shapley values are used to define the systemic risk charge levied upon individual banks. Using a parallelized simulated annealing algorithm the properties of an optimal charge are derived. Among other things we find that there is not necessarily a correspondence between a bank's contribution to systemic risk - which determines its risk charge - and the capital that is optimally injected into it to make the financial system more resilient to systemic risk. The analysis has policy implications for the design of optimal bank levies.

Suggested Citation

  • Bluhm, Marcel & Krahnen, Jan Pieter, 2011. "Default risk in an interconnected banking system with endogeneous asset markets," CFS Working Paper Series 2011/19, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:cfswop:201119
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    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/57342/1/668115955.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Giulio Cimini & Matteo Serri, 2016. "Entangling Credit and Funding Shocks in Interbank Markets," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 11(8), pages 1-15, August.
    2. Sheri M Markose, 2013. "Systemic risk analytics: A data-driven multi-agent financial network (MAFN) approach," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 14(3-4), pages 285-305, July.
    3. Christian Weistroffer, 2011. "Identifying Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs)," Working Papers id:4383, eSocialSciences.
    4. Riedler, Jesper & Brueckbauer, Frank, 2017. "Evaluating regulation within an artificial financial system: A framework and its application to the liquidity coverage ratio regulation," ZEW Discussion Papers 17-022, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    5. Matteo Serri & Guido Caldarelli & Giulio Cimini, 2016. "How the interbank market becomes systemically dangerous: an agent-based network model of financial distress propagation," Papers 1611.04311, arXiv.org.
    6. Hausenblas, Václav & Kubicová, Ivana & Lešanovská, Jitka, 2015. "Contagion risk in the Czech financial system: A network analysis and simulation approach," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 156-180.
    7. Calimani, Susanna & Hałaj, Grzegorz & Żochowski, Dawid, 2017. "Simulating fire-sales in a banking and shadow banking system," ESRB Working Paper Series 46, European Systemic Risk Board.
    8. Oxana Babecka Kucharcukova & Alexis Derviz & Vaclav Hausenblas & Michal Hlavacek & Mark Joy & Narcisa Kadlcakova & Lubos Komarek & Zlatuse Komarkova & Tomas Konecny & Ivana Kubicova & Jitka Lesanovska, 2014. "Macroprudential Research: Selected Issues," Occasional Publications - Edited Volumes, Czech National Bank, edition 2, volume 12, number rb12/2 edited by Jan Babecky & Borek Vasicek, January.
    9. Stanislao Gualdi & Giulio Cimini & Kevin Primicerio & Riccardo Di Clemente & Damien Challet, 2016. "Statistically validated network of portfolio overlaps and systemic risk," Post-Print hal-01705092, HAL.
    10. Pawe{l} Smaga & Mateusz Wili'nski & Piotr Ochnicki & Piotr Arendarski & Tomasz Gubiec, 2016. "Can banks default overnight? Modeling endogenous contagion on O/N interbank market," Papers 1603.05142, arXiv.org.
    11. Krahnen, Jan Pieter, 2013. "Rescue by regulation? Key points of the Liikanen report," SAFE White Paper Series 9, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    12. Montagna, Mattia & Kok, Christoffer, 2013. "Multi-layered interbank model for assessing systemic risk," Kiel Working Papers 1873, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    13. Calimani, Susanna & Hałaj, Grzegorz & Żochowski, Dawid, 2022. "Simulating fire sales in a system of banks and asset managers," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Systemic Risk; Systemic Risk Charge; Systemic Risk Fund; Macroprudential Supervision; Shapley Value; Financial Network;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation

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