Environmental Protection Agencies: Measuring the Welfare Benefits from Regulation under Different Information Contexts
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsEntry deterrence; Signaling; Emission fees; Welfare Benefits;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- Q5 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-11-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2011-11-28 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2011-11-28 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-ENV-2011-11-28 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-REG-2011-11-28 (Regulation)
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