Human Health Care and Selection Effects. Understanding Labour Supply in the Market for Nurses
In this note we study (adverse) selection in a labour supply model where potential applicants are characterised by different vocational premiums and skills. We show how the composition of the pool of active workers changes as wage increases. Contrary to standard results, average productivity does not necessarily increase monotonically in the wage rate. We provide conditions such that a wage increase deteriorates either the average productivity or the average vocation of workers accepting the job. Our results are relevant to understand the potential impacts of a wage increase as a policy aimed at solving shortage in the market for nurses.
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