The dynamics of wages and employment in a model of monopolistic competition and efficient bargaining
Modern macroeconomic models with a Keynesian flavour usually involve nominal rigidities in wages and commodity prices. A widely used conceptual framework is specifying a wage-setting and a price setting equation, while a more explicit microfoundation recurs to wage bargaining in the labour markets and monopolistic competition in the commodity markets; (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2001). Characteristic for those approaches is that deregulating the labour markets (i.e. reducing the bargaining power of workers and/or reducing the unemployment benefits) and/or deregulating the commodity markets (i.e. reducing the market power of commodity suppliers) increases equilibrium employment. However, those models are typically static models which do not specify explicitly the economic process in time. In the following paper, we develop a dynamic macroeconomic model in which commodity markets are characterised by monopolistic competition and labour markets by wage bargaining. The number of firms is fixed; the incorporation of firm entry and exit is left for further research. In our analysis the equilibrium solution is a fixed point of the dynamic model which exhibits the usual comparative static properties (deregulating the labour and/or the commodity market increases employment). However, depending upon the parameters the fixed point may loose stability through a Flip-bifurcation giving rise to cyclical solutions. We show analytically that commodity and labour market deregulation may lead to instability; in numerical simulation we even found cases in which deregulation leads to lower average employment. Both results, valid in a dynamic framework, contrast with the usual comparative static properties.
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- Olivier Blanchard & Francesco Giavazzi, 2001.
"Macroeconomic Effects of Regulation and Deregulation in Goods and Labor Markets,"
NBER Working Papers
8120, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Olivier Blanchard & Francesco Giavazzi, 2003. "Macroeconomic Effects Of Regulation And Deregulation In Goods And Labor Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 118(3), pages 879-907, August.
- Olivier Blanchard & Francesco Giavazzi, . "Macroeconomic effects of regulation and deregulation in goods and labor markets," Working Papers 187, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Blanchard, Olivier J & Giavazzi, Francesco, 2001. "Macroeconomic Effects of Regulation and Deregulation in Goods and Labour Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 2713, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Christopher A. Pissarides, 2000. "Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, 2nd Edition," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262161877, June.
- Lars Calmfors & Åsa Johansson, 2001. "Unemployment Benefits, Contract Length and Nominal Wage Flexibility," CESifo Working Paper Series 514, CESifo Group Munich.
- Calmfors, Lars & Johansson, Åsa, 2001. "Unemployment Benefits, Contract Length And Nominal Wage Flexibility," Seminar Papers 692, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
- Nicola GIAMMARIOLI & Julian MESSINA & Thomas STEINBERGER & Chiara STROZZI, 2002. "European Labor Share Dynamics: An Institutional Perspective," Economics Working Papers ECO2002/13, European University Institute.
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