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Family Values and the Regulation of Labor

Author

Listed:
  • Alberto Alesina

    (Harvard and Igier)

  • Yann Algan

    (Sciences Po, Ofce)

  • Pierre Cahuc

    (Ecole Polytechnique, Crest)

  • Paola Giuliano, UCLA

    (UCLA)

Abstract

Flexible labor markets requires geographically mobile workers to be efficient. Otherwise, firms can take advantage of the immobility of workers and extract monopsony rents. In cultures with strong family ties, moving away from home is costly. Thus, individuals with strong family ties rationally choose regulated labor markets to avoid moving and limiting the monopsony power of firms, even though regulation generates lower employment and income. Empirically, we do find that individuals who inherit stronger family ties are less mobile, have lower wages, are less often employed and support more stringent labor market regulations. There are also positive cross-country correlations between the strength of family ties and labor market rigidities. Finally, we find positive correlations between labor market rigidities at the beginning of the twenty first century and family values prevailing before World War II, which suggests that labor market regulations have deep cultural roots.

Suggested Citation

  • Alberto Alesina & Yann Algan & Pierre Cahuc & Paola Giuliano, UCLA, 2010. "Family Values and the Regulation of Labor," Working Papers 2010.56, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  • Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2010.56
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    JEL classification:

    • J - Labor and Demographic Economics
    • J2 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor
    • J4 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets

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