Uncertainty, market power and credit rationing
This paper explores the nexus between uncertainty and credit restrictions. A Post Keynesian approach to an explanation of access rationing to credit is developed and contrasted with the dominant relationship lending school. It is argued that access rationing to credit has be understood in terms of uncertainty and power. Differences in systemic uncertainty to which hetrogenous market participants are exposed can explain the reluctance of banks to lend to certain applicants. Monopsonistic power and uncertainty further help to understand why banks of a different size show differences in their lending behavior.
|Date of creation:||Aug 2007|
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