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Mixing Family Business with Politics in Thailand

Author

Listed:
  • Masami Imai

    (Economics and East Asian Studies, Wesleyan University)

Abstract

This paper uses newly compiled data on Thai family businesses and their direct participation in politics to examine whether the political participation of family business yields private economic payoff. The paper finds that the political participation of family members is positively associated with the profitability of family businesses. Furthermore, this “political benefit” is found to be particularly large when firms are connected to the cabinet members. These results support the crony capitalism view that powerful business groups in Thailand have an incentive to directly hold influential public offices in order to influence the economic policy in their favor.

Suggested Citation

  • Masami Imai, 2006. "Mixing Family Business with Politics in Thailand," Wesleyan Economics Working Papers 2006-017, Wesleyan University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:wes:weswpa:2006-017
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    Cited by:

    1. Patricio Duran & Marcelo Ortiz & Michael Carney, 2024. "More than Money: Political Participation by Elite Business Families," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 48(6), pages 1495-1524, November.
    2. Kyeongmin Jeon & Jeung-Yoon (Jen) Chang & Young-Soo Choi, 2024. "Politically connected outside directors and market reaction: evidence from Korea," Financial Markets and Portfolio Management, Springer;Swiss Society for Financial Market Research, vol. 38(3), pages 371-397, September.
    3. Grossman, Richard S. & Imai, Masami, 2016. "Taking the lord's name in vain: The impact of connected directors on 19th century British banks," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 75-93.
    4. Daeheon Choi & Chune Young Chung & Soon-Ihl Samuel Hong & Jason Young, 2020. "The Role of Political Collusion in Corporate Performance in the Korean Market," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(5), pages 1-18, March.
    5. Tariq H. Malik, 2019. "Founder’s Apprehension in Small Family Business Succession in Thailand: Interpretative View of the Situational Distance," SAGE Open, , vol. 9(4), pages 21582440198, October.
    6. Liu, Xiaoyan & Zhao, Rui & Guo, Mengmeng, 2023. "CEO turnover, political connections, and firm performance: Evidence from China," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(C).
    7. Chune Young Chung & Jung Hoon Byun & Jason Young, 2019. "Corporate Political Ties and Firm Value: Comparative Analysis in the Korean Market," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(2), pages 1-25, January.
    8. Rajwani, Tazeeb & Liedong, Tahiru Azaaviele, 2015. "Political activity and firm performance within nonmarket research: A review and international comparative assessment," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 273-283.
    9. James S. Ang & David K. Ding & Tiong Yang Thong, 2013. "Political Connection and Firm Value," Asian Development Review, MIT Press, vol. 30(2), pages 131-166, September.
    10. Woon Leong Lin, 2019. "Is Corporate Political Activity an Investment or Agency? An Application of System GMM Approach," Administrative Sciences, MDPI, vol. 9(1), pages 1-22, January.
    11. Ekkayokkaya, Manapol & Pengniti, Tulaya, 2012. "Governance reform and IPO underpricing," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 238-253.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • O53 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Asia including Middle East
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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