Mixing Family Business with Politics in Thailand
This paper uses newly compiled data on Thai family businesses and their direct participation in politics to examine whether the political participation of family business yields private economic payoff. The paper finds that the political participation of family members is positively associated with the profitability of family businesses. Furthermore, this “political benefit” is found to be particularly large when firms are connected to the cabinet members. These results support the crony capitalism view that powerful business groups in Thailand have an incentive to directly hold influential public offices in order to influence the economic policy in their favor.
|Date of creation:||May 2006|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Asian Economic Journal (Vol. 20 No 3, 241-256) on-line at http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/toc/asej/20/3 .|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: PAC 123, 238 Church Street, Middletown, CT 06459-0007|
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