Teacher opinions on performance incentives : evidence from the Kyrgyz Republic
This paper uses data from a post-hoc evaluation of a performance-based teacher incentive program in the Kyrgyz Republic to examine the opinions of teachers receiving different pay bonuses based on their performance as assessed by external evaluators. Overall, teacher opinions of the program were favorable, although teachers who received lower performance ratings held less favorable opinions about the motivational aspects of the program. Despite this, lower-rated teachers were more likely to report that they used what they learned to evaluate their own teaching, as compared with more highly rated teachers, and were more likely to take professional development courses in the years following the program's implementation.
|Date of creation:||01 Jan 2014|
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