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Regulations, institutions, and economic performance : the political economy of the Philippines'telecommunications sector


  • Esfahani, Hadi Salehi
  • DEC


The author addresses the puzzle of sluggish investment in the Philippines'dominant telecommunications firm, PLDT. This case allows a study of the underlying causes of success or failure in a privately owned infrastructure sector in a developing country. Since its inception, PLDT has been privately owned and has had direct access to international capital markets. But its services have been deficient, in quality and quantity, since the early 1960s. Using a transaction costs approach, the author hypothesizes that contracting problems between various economic players are important determinants of observed outcomes. Poor services are attributed to factors that impede implementation of performance - improving implicit or explicit contracts, including regulatory rules and regulations. After reviewing PLDT's responses to events in the last six decades, the author demonstrates that the problem can be traced to lack of commitment to regulatory policies beyond the term of each administration - because a relatively weak legislature and judiciary are dominated by the executive branch. This system of governance is linked to the nature of Philippine society: a small elite engaged in competitive politics among themselves tries to bar the rest of the population from active participation, without actually denying their citizenship. The president of the coutry has great leeway in setting and implementing regulations, so the elite group associated with the president can unilaterally modify telecommunications policy in a way that serves its interests. Those in control of PLDT find investing in the company's highly capital-intensive facilities risky if they are not connected to the president's circle. As a result, the government has an incentive to redistribute quasi-rents through regulatory mechanisms. This imposes a strong"political business cycle"on PLDT's growth pattern: investment rises only in the early years of"friendly"administrations and remains low at all other times. The author establishes this relationship by empirical analysis. Despite the failure of cyclical investment, no attempt has been made to reform the regulatory system because most solutions require an institutional commitment to a set of rules and procedures that are either infeasible or contrary to the interests of the elite. Certain reforms are becoming increasingly feasible, however, as a new middle class develops and elite alliances shift.

Suggested Citation

  • Esfahani, Hadi Salehi & DEC, 1994. "Regulations, institutions, and economic performance : the political economy of the Philippines'telecommunications sector," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1294, The World Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:1294

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Boyce, James K., 1992. "The revolving door? External debt and capital flight: A Philippine case study," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 335-349, March.
    2. Peltzman, Sam, 1976. "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 211-240, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Magnoli Bocchi, Alessandro, 2008. "Rising growth, declining investment : the puzzle of the Philippines," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4472, The World Bank.
    2. Shirley, Mary M., 1999. "Bureaucrats in business: The roles of privatization versus corporatization in state-owned enterprise reform," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 115-136, January.
    3. Galal, Ahmed & Nauriyal, Bharat, 1995. "Regulating telecommunications in developing countries : outcomes, incentives, and commitment," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1520, The World Bank.
    4. Patalinghug, Epictetus & Llanto, Gilberto M., 2005. "Competition Policy and Regulation in Power and Telecommunications," Discussion Papers DP 2005-18, Philippine Institute for Development Studies.


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