Independent Central Banks: Some theoretical and empirical problems?
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983.
"Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy,"
Journal of Monetary Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
- Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1983. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Peter Stella, 2008. "Central Bank Financial Strength, Policy Constraints and Inflation," IMF Working Papers 08/49, International Monetary Fund.
- Dai, Meixing & Sidiropoulos, Moïse, 2008. "Central bank's conservativeness and transparency," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(4), pages 179-187, December.
- Charles Freedman, 1996. "What operating procedures should be adopted to maintain price stability? practical issues," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 241-285.
- Posen, Adam, 1998.
"Central Bank Independence and Disinflationary Credibility: A Missing Link?,"
Oxford Economic Papers,
Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 335-359, July.
- Adam S. Posen, 1995. "Central bank independence and disinflationary credibility: a missing link?," Staff Reports 1, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
- Goodhart, Charles A E & Huang, Haizhou, 1998. "Time Inconsistency in a Model with Lags, Persistence, and Overlapping Wage Contracts," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 378-396, July.
- repec:kap:iaecre:v:12:y:2006:i:3:p:287-297 is not listed on IDEAS
- James Forder, 2003. "'Independence' and the founding of the Federal Reserve," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 50(3), pages 297-310, August.
- Andreas Fischer, 1996. "Central bank independence and sacrifice ratios," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 5-18, January.
- McCallum, Bennett T., 1997.
"Crucial issues concerning central bank independence,"
Journal of Monetary Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 99-112, June.
- Bennett T. McCallum, 1996. "Crucial Issues Concerning Central Bank Independence," NBER Working Papers 5597, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Backus, David & Driffill, John, 1985. "Inflation and Reputation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 530-538, June.
- Ottmar Issing, 2006. "Central Bank Independence - Economic and Political Dimensions," National Institute Economic Review, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, vol. 196(1), pages 66-76, April.
- Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B & Neyapti, Bilin, 1992. "Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 6(3), pages 353-398, September.
- Berger, Helge & de Haan, Jakob & Eijffinger, Sylvester C W, 2001.
" Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence,"
Journal of Economic Surveys,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(1), pages 3-40, February.
- Berger, Helge & de Haan, Jakob & Eijffinger, Sylvester C W, 2000. "Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 2353, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Acheson, Keith & Chant, John F, 1973. "Bureaucratic Theory and the Choice of Central Bank Goals," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 5(2), pages 637-655, May.
- Forder, James, 1998. "Central Bank Independence--Conceptual Clarifications and Interim Assessment," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 307-334, July.
- Mourmouras, Iannis A., 1997. "On Wage Indexing, Policy Credibility and Inflation," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 19-30, January.
- Peter Stella & Ulrich H Klueh, 2008. "Central Bank Financial Strength and Policy Performance; An Econometric Evaluation," IMF Working Papers 08/176, International Monetary Fund.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Geeta Garg, 2015. "Impact of trilemma indicators on macroeconomic policy: Does central bank independence matter?," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2015-019, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
More about this item
Keywordsindependent central banks;
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-06-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBA-2009-06-17 (Central Banking)
- NEP-HPE-2009-06-17 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MAC-2009-06-17 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-MON-2009-06-17 (Monetary Economics)
- NEP-PKE-2009-06-17 (Post Keynesian Economics)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:uwe:wpaper:0908. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Felix Ritchie). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/seuweuk.html .