Compulsory licensing: the foundations of an institutional innovation
Compulsory licensing is an important institutional innovation that improves the knowledge governance and can help fostering the pace of generation of technological knowledge and the rate of introduction of technological innovations. Recent advances in the economics of knowledge have confirmed the medieval wisdom according to which to make knowledge it is necessary to stand on giants’ shoulders. The generation of new technological knowledge is possible only if the stock of existing knowledge can be used as an input. All barriers and delays in the access to existing knowledge risk to reducing the capability to generate new technological knowledge. Intellectual property right regimes based upon exclusivity may increase the incentives to generate new technological knowledge but reduce the efficiency and the actual viability of the knowledge generation process. The costs of the reduction in the access to existing knowledge are larger the larger the scope of application of new technology. Compulsory licensing for technological knowledge can increase the rate of generation of new technological knowledge. The paper contributes the debate with a simple model that enables to identify the correct levels of royalties for compulsory licensing in both product and knowledge markets.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2012|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.unito.it/|
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Petra Moser & Alessandra Voena, 2012.
"Compulsory Licensing: Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 102(1), pages 396-427, February.
- Petra Moser & Alessandra Voena, 2009. "Compulsory Licensing - Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act," NBER Working Papers 15598, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Petra Moser & Alessandra Voena, 2010. "Compulsory Licensing: Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act," Discussion Papers 09-026, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- Gilbert, R. & Shapiro, C., 1988.
"Optimal Patent Length And Breadth,"
28, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
- James Bessen & Eric Maskin, 2006.
"Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Imitation,"
Economics Working Papers
0025, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Bessen, James, 2005. "Patents and the diffusion of technical information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 121-128, January.
- Ottoz Elisabetta & Cugno Franco, 2009.
"Choosing the Scope of Trade Secret Law when Secrets Complement Patents,"
Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers
200911, University of Turin.
- Ottoz, Elisabetta & Cugno, Franco, 2011. "Choosing the scope of trade secret law when secrets complement patents," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 219-227.
- Ottoz, Elisabetta & Cugno, Franco, 2010. "Choosing the scope of trade secret law when secrets complement patents," MPRA Paper 20672, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Kenneth Arrow, 1962. "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention," NBER Chapters, in: The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, pages 609-626 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Antonelli, Cristiano, 2005.
"Technological Knowledge As An Essential Facility,"
Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis LEI & BRICK - Laboratory of Economics of Innovation "Franco Momigliano", Bureau of Research in Innovation, Complexity and Knowledge, Collegio
200504, University of Turin.
- Shavell, Steven & van Ypersele, Tanguy, 2001.
"Rewards versus Intellectual Property Rights,"
Journal of Law and Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(2), pages 525-47, October.
- Shavell, S. & van Ypersele de Strihou, T.P.M.C., 1999. "Rewards versus intellectual property rights," Discussion Paper 1999-26, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, 1999. "Rewards versus Intellectual Property Rights," NBER Working Papers 6956, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Cugno Franco & Ottoz Elisabetta, 2006. "Trade Secret vs. Broad Patent: The Role of Licensing," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 2(2), pages 209-221, September.
- Richard R. Nelson, 1959. "The Simple Economics of Basic Scientific Research," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 67, pages 297.
- Dalle, Jean Michel & David, Paul A. & Besten, Matthijs den & Steinmueller, W. Edward, 2008. "Empirical issues in open source software," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 301-304, December.
- Suzanne Scotchmer, 1991. "Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 29-41, Winter.
- Arundel, Anthony, 2001. "The relative effectiveness of patents and secrecy for appropriation," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 611-624, April.
- Penin, Julien, 2005.
"Patents versus ex post rewards: A new look,"
Elsevier, vol. 34(5), pages 641-656, June.
- Julien Pénin, 2003. "Patents versus ex-post rewards : a new look," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM 20-19, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques.
- Julien Pénin, 2003. "Patents versus ex-post rewards: a new look," Working Papers of BETA 2003-09, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
- Martin L. Weitzman, 1995.
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
1722, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Jean O. Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, 1997. "The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: A Survey of the Empirical Literature," NBER Working Papers 6296, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- F. M. Scherer & Jayashree Watal, 2002. "Post-TRIPS Options for Access to Patented Medicines in Developing Nations," Journal of International Economic Law, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(4), pages 913-939, December.
- Paul M. Romer, 1994. "The Origins of Endogenous Growth," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(1), pages 3-22, Winter.
- Machlup, Fritz & Penrose, Edith, 1950. "The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 10(01), pages 1-29, May.
- Antonelli, Cristiano, 2005.
"Models of knowledge and systems of governance,"
Journal of Institutional Economics,
Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(01), pages 51-73, June.
- Antonelli, Cristiano, 2005. "Models Of Knowledge And Systems Of Governance," Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis LEI & BRICK - Laboratory of Economics of Innovation "Franco Momigliano", Bureau of Research in Innovation, Complexity and Knowledge, Collegio 200501, University of Turin.
- Tandon, Pankaj, 1982. "Optimal Patents with Compulsory Licensing," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(3), pages 470-86, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:uto:labeco:201207. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Piero Cavaleri)or (Marina Grazioli)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.