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Drift and Equilibrium Selection with Human and Computer Players

Author

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  • Mauro Caminati

    ()

  • Alessandro Innocenti

    ()

  • Roberto Ricciuti

    ()

Abstract

The theory of drift (Binmore and Samuelson 1999) concerns equilibrium selection in which second order disturbances may have first-order effects in the emergence of one equilibrium over the other. We provided experimental evidence with human players supporting the model in Caminati, Innocenti and Ricciuti (2006). In this paper we test it with conditioning by computer players. When computers are removed and humans are matched against each other, the comparative static properties of the model are confirmed.

Suggested Citation

  • Mauro Caminati & Alessandro Innocenti & Roberto Ricciuti, 2007. "Drift and Equilibrium Selection with Human and Computer Players," Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena 012, University of Siena.
  • Handle: RePEc:usi:labsit:012
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ellison, Glenn, 1993. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1047-1071, September.
    2. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
    3. Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson, 1999. "Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(2), pages 363-393.
    4. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
    5. Caminati, Mauro & Innocenti, Alessandro & Ricciuti, Roberto, 2006. "Drift effect under timing without observability: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 393-414, November.
    6. Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L., 1995. "Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection," Working papers 9529, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    7. Binmore, Ken & Swierzbinski, Joe & Hsu, Steven & Proulx, Chris, 1993. "Focal Points and Bargaining," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 22(4), pages 381-409.
    8. Roth, Alvin E & Schoumaker, Francoise, 1983. "Expectations and Reputations in Bargaining: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(3), pages 362-372, June.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    drift; equilibrium selection; evolutionary games; experiments.;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior

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