Orchestrating Contests with Heterogeneous Participants
This paper compares static one-stage and dynamic two-stage contests with heterogeneous participants. I find that aggregate effort provision (AEP) is strictly higher in the dynamic than in the static format in any interior equilibrium with heterogeneous contestants. Since AEP is identical in both formats in case of homogeneity, this finding suggests that the well-known (adverse) incentive effect of heterogeneity crucially depends on the structure of the competition – the effect is lower in dynamic than in static formats. The paper also shows that heterogeneity between contestants is crucial to explain recent empirical evidence on the comparison of different contest structures.
|Date of creation:||Aug 2012|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: +41 71 224 23 25
Fax: +41 71 224 31 35
Web page: http://www.seps.unisg.ch/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Höchtl, Wolfgang & Kerschbamer, Rudolf & Stracke, Rudi & Sunde, Uwe, 2011. "Incentives vs. Selection in Promotion Tournaments: Can a Designer Kill Two Birds with One Stone?," IZA Discussion Papers 5755, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2005.
"Asymmetric contests with general technologies,"
Springer, vol. 26(4), pages 923-946, November.
- Amegashie, J Atsu, 2000. " Some Results on Rent-Seeking Contests with Shortlisting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 105(3-4), pages 245-53, December.
- O'Keeffe, Mary & Viscusi, W Kip & Zeckhauser, Richard J, 1984. "Economic Contests: Comparative Reward Schemes," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(1), pages 27-56, January.
- Nti, Kofi O, 1999. " Rent-Seeking with Asymmetric Valuations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 98(3-4), pages 415-30, March.
- Jennifer Brown, 2011. "Quitters Never Win: The (Adverse) Incentive Effects of Competing with Superstars," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 119(5), pages 982 - 1013.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:usg:econwp:2012:18. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Martina Flockerzi)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.