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What do the papers sell?

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Abstract

We model the market for news as a two-sided market where newspapers sell news to readers who value accuracy and sell space to advertisers who value advert-receptive readers. We show that monopolistic newspapers under-report or bias news that sufficiently reduces advertiser profits. Newspaper competition generally reduces the impact of advertising. In fact, as the size of advertising grows, newspapers may paradoxically reduce advertiser bias, due to increasing competition for readers. However, advertisers can counter this effect of competition by committing to news-sensitive cut-off strategies, potentially inducing as much under-reporting as in the monopoly case.

Suggested Citation

  • Matthew Ellman & Fabrizio Germano, 2004. "What do the papers sell?," Economics Working Papers 800, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Feb 2006.
    • Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:800
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    Cited by:

    1. Zilinsky, Jan, 2009. "Média, vlastníci a tlaky: súhrn poznatkov o trhu s informáciami [Media, owners and pressures: our understanding of the market for information]," MPRA Paper 13660, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Li, Ming & Tymofiy Mylovanov, 2009. "Credibility for Sale: the Effect of Disclosure on Information Acquisition and Transmission," Working Papers 09008, Concordia University, Department of Economics, revised Oct 2009.
    3. Dewenter Ralf & Heimeshoff Ulrich, 2014. "Media Bias and Advertising: Evidence from a German Car Magazine," Review of Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 65(1), pages 77-94, April.
    4. Zhou, Qiaomei & Mei, Qiang & Liu, Suxia & Wang, Qiwei, 2020. "Dual-effects of core enterprise management and media attention on occupational health and safety of small and medium suppliers in China," Technology in Society, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    5. Petrova, Maria, 2011. "Newspapers and Parties: How Advertising Revenues Created an Independent Press," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 105(4), pages 790-808, November.
    6. Matthew Ellman & Fabrizio Germano, 2009. "What do the Papers Sell? A Model of Advertising and Media Bias," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(537), pages 680-704, April.
    7. Petrova, Maria, 2012. "Mass media and special interest groups," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 17-38.
    8. Sobbrio, Francesco, 2009. "A Citizens-Editors Model of News Media," MPRA Paper 18213, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Dewenter, Ralf & Heimeshoff, Ulrich, 2012. "More ads, more revs? Is there a media bias in the likelihood to be reviewed?," DICE Discussion Papers 57, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    10. Elena Panova, 2009. "Confirmatory News," Cahiers de recherche 0912, CIRPEE.
    11. Fabrizio Germano, 2008. "On commercial media bias," Economics Working Papers 1133, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Apr 2009.
    12. Sobbrio, Francesco, 2009. "Indirect Lobbying and Media Bias," MPRA Paper 18215, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Two-sided markets; advertising; media accuracy; media bias; media economics.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media

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