Labor Conflicts and Inefficiency of Relationship-Specific Investments: What is the Judge's Role?
This paper presents a model of litigation in the context of a labor contract. The main objective of our analysis is to determine whether and under which conditions it is efficient that the judiciary arbiters a labor conflict and how the judge's decision should be made in order to be optimal. We embed this idea by considering a relationship between an employer and his worker, in which they can make (non contractible) relationship-specific investments. The optimality here refers to the best investment incentives of the parties allowing to maximize the generated surplus. We derive conclusions about the judge's behavior giving right investment incentives and determine how the division of the surplus should vary depending on several economic and social parameters.
|Date of creation:||2007|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: PEGE. 61, Aven. de la Forêt-Noire 67000 Strasbourg|
Phone: +33 3 68 85 20 69
Fax: +33 3 68 85 20 70
Web page: http://www.beta-umr7522.fr/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kennan, John & Wilson, Robert, 1993.
"Bargaining with Private Information,"
Journal of Economic Literature,
American Economic Association, vol. 31(1), pages 45-104, March.
- Caballero, Ricardo J. & Cowan, Kevin N. & Engel, Eduardo M.R.A. & Micco, Alejandro, 2013.
"Effective labor regulation and microeconomic flexibility,"
Journal of Development Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 92-104.
- Ricardo J. Caballero & Kevin N. Cowan & Eduardo M.R.A. Engel & Alejandro Micco, 2004. "Effective Labor Regulation and Microeconomic Flexibility," NBER Working Papers 10744, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ricardo J. Caballero & Eduardo M.R.A. Engel & Alejandro Micco, 2004. "Effective Labor Regulation and Microeconomic Flexibility," Working Papers 893, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
- Ricardo J Caballero & Kevin N Cowan & Eduardo M.R.A. Engel & Alejandro Micco, 2007. "Effective Labor Regulation and Microeconomic Flexibility," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000990, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Ricardo J. Caballero & Kevin Cowan & Eduardo M. R. A. Engel & Alejandro Micco, 2004. "Effective labor regulation and microeconomic flexibility," Working Papers 04-6, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
- Ricardo J. Caballero & Kevin N. Cowan & Eduardo M.R.A. Engel & Alejandro Micco, 2004. "Effective Labor Regulation and Microeconomic Flexibility," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1480, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jun 2010.
- Bruno Deffains & Dominique Demougin, 2006. "Institutional Competition, Political Process and Holdup," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2006-027, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
- Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 1984. "Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(3), pages 404-415, Autumn.
- Botero, J. C. & Djankov, S. & Porta, R. L. & Lopez-de-Silanes, F. & Shleifer, Andrei, 2004. "The Regulation of Labor," Scholarly Articles 27867241, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Andrea Ichino & Michele Polo & Enrico Rettore, .
"Are Judges Biased by Labor Market Conditions?,"
192, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Belot, Michèle & Boone, Jan & van Ours, Jan C, 2002.
"Welfare Effects of Employment Protection,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3396, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Olivier Blanchard & Jean Tirole, 2004. "Redesigning the Employment Protection System," De Economist, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 1-20, 03.
- Froeb, Luke M. & Kobayashi, Bruce H., 2001. "Evidence production in adversarial vs. inquisitorial regimes," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 267-272, February.
- Juan C. Botero & Simeon Djankov & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2004.
"The Regulation of Labor,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 119(4), pages 1339-1382.
- Juan Botero & Simeon Djankov & Rafael LaPorta & Florencio López-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, . "The Regulation of Labor," Working Paper 19483, Harvard University OpenScholar.
- Simeon Djankov & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer & Juan Botero, 2003. "The Regulation of Labor," NBER Working Papers 9756, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Miguel Á. Malo, 2000. "A Simple Model of Severance Pay Determination: The Case of Individual Dismissals in Spain," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 14(2), pages 269-290, 06.
- Bruno Deffains & Dominique Demougi, 2006. "Institutional Competition, Political Process and Holdup," Working Papers of BETA 2006-13, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
- Muthoo,Abhinay, 1999. "Bargaining Theory with Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521576475, November.
- John T. Addison & Paulino Teixeira, 2003.
"The Economics of Employment Protection,"
Journal of Labor Research,
Transaction Publishers, vol. 24(1), pages 85-129, January.
- Cahuc, Pierre & Zylberberg, André, 2000.
"Redundancy payments, incomplete labor contracts, unemployment and welfare,"
CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange)
- Cahuc, Pierre & Zylberberg, Andre, 1999. "Redundancy Payments, Incomplete Labor Contracts, Unemployment and Welfare," IZA Discussion Papers 96, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Cooter, Robert D & Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1989. "Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 27(3), pages 1067-97, September.
- Peter Rühmann & Jens Südekum, 2001.
"Severance Payments and Firm-Specific Human Capital,"
Departmental Discussion Papers
111, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
- Jens Suedekum & Peter Ruehmann, 2003. "Severance Payments and Firm-specific Human Capital," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 17(1), pages 47-62, 03.
- Hart, Oliver D & Moore, John, 1988.
"Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation,"
Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 755-85, July.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1985. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Working papers 367, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Hardman Moore, John & Hart, Oliver, 1985. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," CEPR Discussion Papers 60, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Jean Tirole, 1999. "Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 741-782, July.
- MacLeod, W Bentley & Malcomson, James M, 1993. "Investments, Holdup, and the Form of Market Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 811-37, September.
- Etienne Wasmer, 2006. "General versus Specific Skills in Labor Markets with Search Frictions and Firing Costs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 811-831, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2007-04. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.