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Dominance and Competitive Bundling

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  • Hurkens, Sjaak
  • Jeon, Doh-Shin
  • Menicucci, Domenico

Abstract

We study bundling by a dominant multi-product firm facing competition from a rival multi-product firm. Compared to competition under independent pricing, competition under pure bundling reduces (increases) each firm's profit for low (high) levels of dominance, while for intermediate levels of dominance, it increases the dominant firm's profit but reduces the rival's profit. The latter result provides a justification for the use of contractual bundling to build entry barrier. When we allow for mixed bundling, we find a threshold level of dominance above which the unique outcome is the one under pure bundling.

Suggested Citation

  • Hurkens, Sjaak & Jeon, Doh-Shin & Menicucci, Domenico, 2013. "Dominance and Competitive Bundling," TSE Working Papers 13-423, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised May 2018.
  • Handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:27441
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    Cited by:

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    2. Sang‐Hyun Kim & Jong‐Hee Hahn, 2022. "On the profitability of interfirm bundling in oligopolies," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(3), pages 657-673, August.
    3. Cuntz, Alexander & Bergquist, Kyle, 2022. "Exclusive content and platform competition in Latin America," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    4. Shuai, Jie & Yang, Huanxing & Zhang, Lan, 2022. "Dominant firm and competitive bundling in oligopoly markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 421-447.
    5. Zhou, Jidong, 2021. "Mixed bundling in oligopoly markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
    6. Chiara Fumagalli & Massimo Motta, 2024. "Economic Principles for the Enforcement of Abuse of Dominance Provisions," Working Papers 1431, Barcelona School of Economics.
    7. Etro, Federico, 2019. "Mergers of complements and entry in innovative industries," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 302-326.
    8. Belleflamme,Paul & Peitz,Martin, 2015. "Industrial Organization," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107687899.
    9. Jidong Zhou, 2017. "Competitive Bundling," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85, pages 145-172, January.
    10. Angelika Endres-Fröhlich & Joachim Heinzel, 2022. "The Impact of Product Qualities on Downstream Bundling in a Distribution Channel," Working Papers Dissertations 90, Paderborn University, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics.
    11. Innocenti, Federico & Menicucci, Domenico, 2021. "Partial compatibility in oligopoly," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 188(C), pages 351-378.
    12. Michael G Jacobides & Ioannis Lianos, 2021. "Ecosystems and competition law in theory and practice [Ecosystem as structure: an actionable construct for strategy]," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 30(5), pages 1199-1229.
    13. Angelika Endres-Fröhlich & Burkhard Hehenkamp & Joachim Heinzel, 2022. "The Impact of Product Differentiation on Retail Bundling in a Vertical Market," Working Papers Dissertations 91, Paderborn University, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics.
    14. Sarat Kumar Jena & Abhijeet Ghadge, 2022. "Product bundling and advertising strategy for a duopoly supply chain: a power-balance perspective," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 315(2), pages 1729-1753, August.
    15. Yufeng Huang, 2022. "Tied Goods and Consumer Switching Costs," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 41(1), pages 93-114, January.
    16. Gregory S. Crawford, 2015. "The economics of television and online video markets," ECON - Working Papers 197, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    17. Joao Macieira & Pedro Pereira & Joao Vareda, 2013. "Bundling Incentives in Markets with Product Complementarities: The Case of Triple-Play," Working Papers 13-15, NET Institute.
    18. Crawford, Gregory, 2015. "The Economics of Television and Online Video Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 10676, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    19. Kuroda, Toshifumi & Ida, Takanori & Koguchi, Teppei, 2015. "The impact of asymmetric regulation on product bundling: The case of fixed broadband and mobile communications in Japan," 2015 Regional ITS Conference, Los Angeles 2015 146318, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
    20. Doh-Shin Jeon & Domenico Menicucci & Nikrooz Nasr, 2015. "Dynamics of Compatibility under Switching Costs," Working Papers 15-17, NET Institute, revised Oct 2015.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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